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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms  
 
Adaptive capacity – the ability of a system to adapt. Believed to contribute to 
‘resilience’. 
 
Asset-based recovery – An approach based on the belief that ‘one cannot develop 
communities from the top down or from the outside in’ but requires building from 
the inside out, with residents investing in themselves, ideas, assets and resources 
 
BaU – Business as Usual 
 
Case Management - ‘Case management’ refers to a coordinated approach to service 
provision, ideally through one or just a few points of contact. It has been defined as 
‘a collaborative process of assessment, planning, facilitation and advocacy for 
options and services to meet an individual’s holistic needs through communication 
and available resources to promote quality cost-effective outcomes’ 
(http://www.cmsa.org.au/definition.html). It stands in contrast to an approach 
where the individual identifies and chooses different service providers, for different 
issues, with little overall integration or coordination. This can lead to gaps in service 
provision and duplication of effort.  
 
CCC – Christchurch City Council 
 
CDEM – Civil Defence and Emergency management 
 
CERC - Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission 
 
CERA - Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
 
DBH – Department of Building and Housing  
 
ENC – Enterprise North Canterbury 
 
EOC - Emergency Operations Centre  
 
EQC - Earthquake Commission  
 
ERC - Earthquake Recovery Committee, comprising Waimakariri District Council’s 
elected Councillors and Kaiapoi Community Board Chair.  
 
HNZ – Housing New Zealand 
 
LAPP - Local Authority Protection Programme  
 
LGA – Local Government Act 
 
LAPP - Local Authority Protection Programme  
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Lateral spread - cracks that open in the ground as a result slippage caused by 
earthquakes. 
 
Liquefaction - the process by which saturated, unconsolidated sediment acts more 
like a liquid. Cantabrians generally use liquefaction as a noun referring to the ‘sand 
volcanoes’ that erupt after severe ground shaking.   
 
MCDEM – Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
 
MSD – Ministry of Social Development 
 
Phronesis – Practical wisdom 
 
PMO – Project Management Offices for undertaking rebuild work  
 
RAC - Recovery Assistance Centre, located in the council’s Community Centre in 
Sewell Street Kaiapoi, and later became  ‘the Hub’.  
 
Red Zone – Refers to geographic areas  
 
Resilience – Often seen in a positive light, resilience can be defined as a system’s 
ability to ‘bounce back’, ‘cope’ with new conditions, or ‘thrive’.  
 
Response phase – pertains the immediate aftermath of disaster before functionality 
has been restored. Followed by ‘recovery’, ‘reduction’ (of vulnerability to future 
risk), and ‘readiness’.  
 
Retreat – residential movement away from the affected Red Zones 
 
SDC – Selwyn District Council 
 
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure 
 
TLAs - Territorial Local Authorities (TLAs) 
 
Unit rates – a cost per unit, such as the cost per metre of installed sewerage of a 
pre-determined capacity/quality.  
 
VBRRA - Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery and Authority 
 
WESS – Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service 
 
WINZ – Work and Income New Zealand 
 
WNC – Wellbeing North Canterbury 
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Executive Summary 
At 4.36am on the 4th September, 2010, the Canterbury region of New Zealand was 
rocked by a 7.1 magnitude earthquake. The result was extensive damage to Kaiapoi, 
Pines Beach and Kairaki in the Waimakariri District, and certain parts of nearby 
Christchurch. A quarter of Kaiapoi businesses were immediately affected, and there 
was widespread damage to local infrastructure: 5, 000 people lost water and sewer 
services.  Almost 1, 200 homes - a third of all housing stock in Kaiapoi and most 
homes in Pines Beach and Kairaki - were severely damaged and 1, 048 were 
eventually ‘red-zoned’.  
 
This report focuses on the Waimakariri District Council’s approach to earthquake 
recovery which was developed as an Integrated, Community-based Recovery 
Framework. This approach has been held up as exemplary in a number of fora and 
has received a great deal of interest and support both nationally and internationally. 
It has evolved as a result of the September earthquake and the thousands of 
aftershocks that have followed, along with the regulatory changes that have 
impacted on building safety and land availability since, but it builds on a set of pre-
existing competencies and a well-established organisational culture that focusses 
on: 
 
 Working with communities and each other; 
 Keeping people informed; 
 Doing better everyday; 
 Taking responsibility;  
 Acting with integrity, honesty and trust.1 
 
The report identifies, and speaks to, three themes or tensions drawn from either the 
disaster/emergency management literature or actual cases of recovery practice 
observed here in Canterbury over the last 2 years. These themes are the:  
 
1. unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ 
recovery work with community at the centre, versus the lack of clarity 
around both community and local government’s role in disaster recovery; 
 
2. general consensus that good local government-community relationships are 
crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best 
to engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 
 
3. balancing Business as Usual (BaU) with recovery issues.  
 
Some key findings around these three themes are summarised here and detailed 
further below.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 These points are taken from the Waimakariri District Council’s mission statement. 
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1. The unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ 
recovery work with community at the centre, versus the lack of clarity around 
both community and local government’s role in disaster recovery; 
 
There are a number of factors that make local government (Territorial Local 
Authorities or TLAs) an important and unique ‘recovery agent’ including: 
 
 Residents’ expectations; 
 TLA’s working knowledge of the area, including land and infrastructure 
information, maps, and so on; 
 Pre-existing relationships with communities, contractors, government 
agencies and NGOs;  
 Resources or ‘social infrastructure’, including community halls, reserves, and 
so on; 
 Their elected mandate and decision-making authority; 
 Access to discretionary funding; 
 Legislative responsibilities which, until recently, were consistent and 
complementary across both the Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Act (2002) and the Local Government Act (2002, Amendment in process, 
2012/2013); and 
 Their pre-existing ‘integrative’ framework of needs assessment and service 
delivery that is able to be modified as required, rather than be developed ‘on 
the fly’. 
 
The pre-existing integrative framework seeks to reconcile, broadly, social, economic 
and environmental (including infrastructure) services, and Recovery Manager Simon 
Markham was keen to make the point that ‘recovery’ is not just about repairing 
infrastructure. Indeed, it is often the ‘more difficult to assess, fund and action’ social 
and economic elements of recovery that become the greater challenge and may 
cause the more enduring issues. It is therefore important not to rely on a pre-
existing ‘process-driven’ framework that may be easy to justify and account for, but 
which does not actually promote recovery. Thus, any pre-existing framework may 
need to accommodate a new programme of specific works with ‘stretchy’ 
timeframes to ensure particular, meaningful goals are being achieved.    
 
Because the Waimakariri District Council’s scope of activities was reasonably broad 
pre-earthquake, their pre-existing integrative structure worked well, but it did have 
to be augmented and modified to a considerable extent post-quake. These 
modifications were possible because the council has: 
 Strong, but distributed leadership. Both Mayor David Ayers and CEO Jim 
Palmer demonstrated strong leadership; however, decision-making authority 
is distributed throughout the organisation. This ‘flat’ rather than strictly 
hierarchical structure enabled very rapid progress to be made. 
 Good alignment and communication between the community, the elected 
members and the bureaucracy. 
 Good ‘adaptive capacity’, meaning the organisation was able to restructure 
and add/drop capacity and capability as needs dictated. This was facilitated 
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by the medium size of the council (approx. 235 FTEs) which meant they could 
balance economies of scale whilst minimising the costs of administering that 
scale (such as time delays, paperwork). Their medium size, and the decision 
(pre-quake) to out-source certain services/functions, also meant they had an 
extended ‘architecture of engagement’ with agencies, consultants and 
contractors, many of whom willingly added capacity/capability post-quake.  
 
Some specific modifications that were made to the pre-existing organisational 
structure in order to integrate the various issues arising in the post-quake 
environment included (but were not limited to) the establishment of the Earthquake 
Recovery Committee (ERC) comprising all Councillors and the Kaiapoi Community 
Board Chair; the establishment of the Recovery Assistance Centre (RAC)/the Hub in 
Sewell Street, Kaiapoi; new funding streams; new steering groups for co-ordinating 
internally and externally; innovative means of ‘engaging’ and ‘engaging with’ the 
community; and the appointments of a) a Recovery Manager (who actively 
represents Waimakariri’s interests outside the district and engages with the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) for example), b) Infrastructure 
Recovery Manager and c) Social Recovery Manager (with these last two co-locating 
in adjoining offices at the Hub) and d) a dedicated Earthquake Communications Co-
ordinator. These adaptations allowed the organisation to rapidly and effectively help 
the local community through integrating and cross-validating a wealth of 
information, and undertaking a co-ordinated/targeted range of recovery (and BaU) 
programmes. 
 
2. Good local government-community relationships are crucial to recovery 
processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best to engage, and engage 
with, communities post-disaster. 
 
The second theme or tension identified in this report concerns best practice around 
community ‘involvement’ after disaster. The Waimakariri District Council’s strategy 
has been to ‘remain centred on the affected community, even when there are other 
pressures’ and they have undertaken a range of practises, programmes and activities 
that involve the public. The notion of ‘involvement’ deserves greater nuance, and 
this report draws on an important distinction between ‘engaging’ and ‘engaging 
with’ communities. ‘Engaging’ communities speaks to the delegation of tasks, roles 
and responsibilities to various communities, with support where necessary. This 
approach has been adopted by the Waimakariri District Council and has involved the 
Social Recovery Manager (and others) co-ordinating, facilitating and enabling 
different community-based recovery programmes, rather than actually delivering 
them. The development of, and on-going support for, the Waimakariri Earthquake 
Support Coordination Service (WESS) post-September, and the establishment of the 
Welfare Centre in Rangiora post-February are good examples. This approach 
empowers communities and this, in turn, is said to promote recovery.  
 
‘Engaging with’ communities is about two-way, honest communication using 
sometimes unorthodox means. From public meetings to kitchen table chats, from 
newspaper advertisements to hand-delivered newsletters, Waimakariri District 
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Council has tailored message to medium very well. They have aimed to be mindful of 
residents’ concerns and answer the hundreds of questions that arise in the post-
disaster situation in a frank and timely way.    
 
3. Balancing Business as Usual with recovery issues.  
 
The earthquake immediately and severely impacted Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki 
and Business and Usual (BaU) was suspended with the declaration of a State of 
Emergency at 10.03 am 4th September. For two weeks, ‘there was no BaU’, and all 
resources were directed towards the affected areas. However, other parts of the 
district were largely unscathed and despite the on-going issues in Kaiapoi, Pines 
Beach and Kairaki, the normal course of business eventually had to be resumed. 
Blending recovery and BaU has been challenging. 
 
Simon Markham, Waimakariri District Council’s Recovery Manager, has identified a 
number of different ‘contexts for recovery’ ranging from small, localised disasters, 
through to severe, regional catastrophes, arguing that each of these contexts 
demands a different approach from TLAs. Though initially the Waimakariri District 
suspended BaU to concentrate on the immediate response, during the recovery 
phase they adopted a ‘hybrid’ BaU/recovery model where staff members generally 
perform dual roles rather than ‘recovery only’. To accommodate the extra workload, 
savings in time and resources have had to come from new processes (such as the 
move to ‘unit rates’, soft copy on consents, and parallel rather than sequential 
processing of consents), new steering groups to facilitate and integrate 
BaU/recovery, out-sourcing of certain tasks, some organisational restructuring, and 
targeted funding for short-term appointments.     
 
Key Questions Arising from this Report 
 
The report raises some important questions. The first question concerns the broader 
legislative environment that connects TLA’s response and recovery roles (e.g. the 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act, 2002) and ‘peacetime’ core local 
government purpose (i.e. the Local Government Amendment Act, 2012) which is 
now rather narrowly defined. Specifically, to what extent does the amendment 
promote or discourage the competencies and capabilities that are required for 
response and recovery that have been demonstrated by the Waimakariri District 
Council during and after disaster.  
 
The second question concerns the extent to which the “Waimakariri Way” can be 
scaled up to larger metropolitan areas or transferred to other recovery contexts. 
There was a high level of consensus among those interviewed that although the 
actual steps taken would be different, ‘the attitude can be up-sized’. This ‘attitude’ is 
evident in the following quotation from a council senior manager who related this 
story: 
Traditionally TLAs do not step across the home-owner’s boundary 
and any infrastructure issues between the house and the front 
boundary is the home-owner’s problem. But post-earthquake it 
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would have been impossible to just call a plumber to get the issue 
fixed. So we [Waimakariri District Council] made a decision fairly 
early on to liaise with EQC and coordinate repairs across the 
boundary because there’s no point us fixing our side of the sewer 
and people still not being able to use [the toilet] because the pipe 
between the house and the boundary is broken.  
 
This quotation shows an organisation working with communities and taking 
responsibility as outlined in their mission statement, and at the same time 
demonstrating leadership, cost effectiveness and common sense.  
 
This report details a particular account of one TLA’s recovery, and although there are 
many ‘takeaways for practise’, it should not be used in a purely prescriptive way. 
That said, it does raise a final question about the ways in which other TLAs might 
prepare, during peacetime, for an extended disaster sequence like the one 
experienced here. Some suggestions detailed further in this report include 
cultivating good, functional outreach programmes with consultants, contractors and 
community groups; supporting civil defence at the highest level; pre-appointing 
Recovery and Social Recovery Managers, and making sure the latter has some 
community development expertise; keeping up-to-date lists of maps, assets and 
hazards; keeping debt under control; and fostering some consensus between the 
public, the elected members and the bureaucracy over TLA’s core business without 
eliminating healthy debate.    
 
A Roadmap of this Report 
 
This report is divided into five further sections:  
 
Section A provides an introduction to the Waimakariri District, the council, a brief 
literature review and some methodological considerations. 
 
Section B comprises a chronological account of the response and recovery 
programmes and activities taken by the Waimakariri District Council from 
September 2010 to September 2012.  
 
Section C details ‘the Framework’ in terms of key lessons and learnings. These are 
arranged around three themes: 
 
 The unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ 
recovery work, versus the lack of clarity around local government’s role in disaster 
recovery;  
 
 The general consensus that good local government-community relationships are 
crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best to 
engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and  
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 Balancing Business as Usual with recovery issues. 
 
 
Section D outlines ‘what mattered’ as the Framework unfolded and provides further 
details on the Waimakariri District Council’s: 
 
 Strong, focussed but distributed leadership; 
 Alignment between the CEO Jim Palmer, senior management, Mayor David 
Ayers and elected members (including Community Boards), and local 
communities; 
 High levels of social capital; 
 Adaptive capacity;  
 Being pro-active and cost-effective; 
 Triangulation of evidence; 
 Putting people before pipes. 
  
Section E discusses some implications of, and questions raised by, the Integrated, 
Community-based Framework, particularly around the possibility of ‘up-scaling’ their 
approach to larger, metropolitan areas; the role of local government during 
recovery; the nature of community engagement; the proposed changes to the Local 
Government Act (2002); the size of council; and suggestions for other TLAs.    
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Section A: Introduction 
At 4.36am on the 4th September, 2010, the Canterbury region of New Zealand was 
rocked by a 7.1 magnitude earthquake which came to be known as the Darfield 
quake, named after the small settlement near the epicentre. The initial earthquake 
(and the on-going 13, 000 aftershocks) caused liquefaction and lateral spread2 of up 
to 3.5 metres in parts of the region, but the worst damage occurred in the 
Waimakariri District (in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki) and the Eastern suburbs of 
Christchurch City. While there were no fatalities in the September quake, these 
communities were immediately and severely impacted.  
 
This report focuses on the Waimakariri District Council’s Integrated, Community-
based Recovery Framework which evolved as a result of the Darfield earthquake, 
the aftershocks and the regulatory changes that have impacted on building safety 
and land availability since. The District, lying north of the Waimakariri River and the 
city of Christchurch, has traditionally been described as agricultural but it has an 
increasing number of lifestyle blocks and small-holdings devoted to horticulture. 
Other changes are also taking place: The district’s small townships are increasing 
rapidly in size, and Waimakariri District now has a population of about 50, 000 
people located in the two main towns – Rangiora and Kaiapoi – and other smaller 
settlements such as Woodend, Pegasus, and Oxford. These form a commuter 
corridor of expanding towns, with many residents travelling to work in Christchurch 
each day.  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Waimakariri District (North of the Waimakariri River and Christchurch city) 
                                                 
2
 ‘Liquefaction’ actually refers to the process by which saturated, unconsolidated sediment acts more 
like a liquid but Cantabrians generally use liquefaction as a noun referring to the ‘sand volcanoes’ that 
erupt after severe ground shaking. Cantabrians use the term ‘lateral spread’ to describe cracks that 
open in the ground as a result of the earthquakes.    
 13 
 
 
Much of the land to the east of Rangiora, and particular parts of Kaiapoi, is low-lying 
former swampland and this – along with Kaiapoi’s riverside location - explains some 
of the immediate effects of the Darfield earthquake which included: 
 
Social/Community:  
 Almost 1200 homes - a third of all housing stock in Kaiapoi and many homes 
in Pines Beach and Kairaki - were severely damaged and 1, 048 were 
eventually ‘red-zoned’;  
 On-going aftershocks causing widespread fear, anxiety and uncertainty;  
 Major disruptions to everyday life, including temporary school closures and 
loss of basic community facilities, services and activities. For some, the 
extended disruption has led to social isolation and on-going trauma. 
 Long-term closure of some major recreation facilities including the library, 
aquatic centre, community halls, the movie theatre, bars and cafes. 
 
Economic/Business:  
 The main street of Kaiapoi was cordoned off with 25 per cent of local 
businesses affected. Post-quake, 17 businesses relocated (11 permanently) 
and 17 ceased trading (5 permanently, 7 unknown)3; 
 Several major businesses and many smaller enterprises closed with flow on 
effects for employees and the viability of goods and service provision within 
Kaiapoi. 
 Though not ‘immediately affected’ Rangiora’s High Street has been more 
slowly disrupted through the closure of earthquake-prone (and therefore 
dangerous) buildings.   
Engineering/Infrastructure damage to: 
 16km of roads; 
 16 bridge approaches and 2 footbridges; 
 12 km of water mains; 
 10km storm water mains to repair/replace; 
 3 water supply pump stations; 
 18km gravity sewers; 
 15 sewer pump stations (4 unserviceable); 
 5, 000 people without water and sewer. 
 
Whilst in absolute terms the 4th Sept 2010 ‘Darfield quake’ caused less damage to 
Kaiapoi than the later February 22nd 2011 did to Christchurch, proportionally 
speaking Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki (and later, the Rangiora town centre) 
were hit just as hard. Comparisons are, however, less important than the 
observation that the damage caused by the Darfield quake could easily have 
                                                 
3
 ENC report (www.northcanterbury.co.nz). 
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overwhelmed a council that was less prepared. It did not, and this is testament to 
Waimakariri District Council’s culture, capability, capacity and relationships with the 
wider community.  
 
Although these last two years have been enormously challenging for the 
Waimakariri District Council staff, elected members and local communities, the 
council has demonstrated remarkable resilience overall. Resilience is generally 
defined as a system’s ability to absorb, withstand or recover from a disturbance 
while maintaining core functionality and identity. Based on such definitions it is easy 
to construct resilience – and recovery – as the restoration of essential services, with 
a particular focus on hard infrastructure. In attempting a more holistic approach, 
however, it has become common to include other recovery indicators around retail 
and commercial activity (and ‘business confidence’) and situate these alongside 
migratory patterns, housing trends, reports of domestic violence, suicide, alcohol 
abuse, crime rates or, more positively, participation in recreation activities, etc.  
 
Viewed in this way, resilience generally (and recovery more specifically) spans a 
wide range of functions, services and provisions, and it is for this reason TLAs are 
charged with particular responsibilities under the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act (CDEM Act, 2002). These legislated responsibilities include: 
• uniting with regional neighbours and emergency services to form a Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management Group (see Figure 2);  
• developing a coordinated CDEM Group plan for how the Group manages its 
hazards;  
• planning and providing for CDEM in the district;  
• ensuring the ability to function to the fullest possible extent during and after 
an emergency.  
 
 
Figure 2: Canterbury CDEM Group Area 
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Though both the legislative responsibilities of various stakeholders and the 
Canterbury Group Plan are fairly well-documented,4 the actual practice of response 
and recovery has varied considerably across the region. In particular, the 
Canterbury CDEM Group, and the relationships between the Group and the three 
City/District Councils affected by the earthquakes, has been the subject of 
considerable investigation, and resulted in the publication of the Review of the 
CDEM Response to the February 22nd Earthquake.5 The review’s focus is primarily on 
the CDEM Group/Christchurch City Council relationship, and if the Waimakariri 
District Council is mentioned, the context is usually positive.6 The association 
between the Waimakariri District Council and the Group during the response phase 
has been described as ‘generally very good’. This has been attributed, in part, to the 
council’s CEO - Jim Palmer’s – involvement in, and support of, civil defence and 
emergency management programmes pre-disaster.      
Whilst disaster preparedness and response obligations are presented in some detail, 
a council’s responsibilities with respect to recovery in the CDEM Act are less 
prescriptive. Recovery is defined as ‘The coordinated efforts and processes to effect 
the immediate, medium and long term holistic regeneration of a community 
following a disaster’7 and is said to encompass: 
 Minimising the escalation of the consequences of the disaster;  
 Regeneration of the social, emotional, economic and physical well-being of 
individuals and communities;  
 Taking opportunities to adapt to meet the social, economic, natural and built 
environments future needs; and  
 Reducing future exposure to hazards and their associated risks. 
The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s Focus on Recovery 
A Holistic Framework for Recovery in New Zealand (2005) augments the CDEM Act 
to provide general guidelines around recovery functions and responsibilities. More 
specifically, these include: 
 The assessment of the needs of a community affected by the events; 
                                                 
4
 The Canterbury Group’s plan, adopted in 2005, is available on  
http://www.cdemcanterbury.govt.nz/cdem-group-plan-downloads.html 
5
 Review of the CDEM Response to the February 22
nd
 Earthquake 
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/Files/ReviewOfTheCDEMResponseToThe22FebChc
hEQ/$file/ReviewOfTheCDEMResponseTo22FebChchEarthquake_Final%20Report_4%20July%202012.
pdf 
6
 As one example, the review mentions (2012, p. 130) the Waimakariri District Council’s revised 
registration form that was used in the   Welfare Centres, and subsequently adopted as a template for 
all of New Zealand. Another example is the Waimakariri District Council’s hand-delivered newsletters 
that went out to affected residents on the 4
th
 September (Appendix 1). The Review concludes that 
the Waimakariri District Council “by all accounts performed very well in both major earthquakes” and 
recommends that “A Group would incorporate the skills and resources of such TLAs into the 
response” (2012, p. 192).  
7
 http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_url/for-the-cdem-sector-recovery-
index?opendocument) 
 16 
 
 The co-ordination of resources made available to the community;  
 Actions relating to community rehabilitation and restoration; and 
 New measures to reduce hazards and risks. 
 
However, it is also noted that there must still be considerable flexibility in the 
approach, so that ‘recovery actions can be suited to local needs and can change as 
best practice develops’ (ibid, 2005, p. 3).  
 
MCDEM’s holistic recovery framework (ibid, 2005, p. 6) puts the community at the 
centre of the recovery process emphasising that:  
 
Recovery extends beyond just restoring physical assets or 
providing welfare services …to recognise that both communities 
and individuals have a wide and variable range of recovery needs 
and that recovery is only successful where all are addressed in a 
coordinated way. Recovery… may extend for years and possibly 
decades. Organisations involved in recovery will need to recognise 
the commitment required to resource (both human and material) 
and the provision of business as usual services during medium and 
long term recovery. 
A holistic and integrated framework is needed to consider the 
multi-faceted aspects of recovery which, when combined, support 
the foundations of community sustainability. The framework 
encompasses the community and four environments: social, 
economic, natural and built environment.8  
 
In addition to coordinating hard and ‘soft’ infrastructure repair, and adequately 
resourcing/integrating recovery with business as usual for an extended period, the 
document highlights the need for adequate community ‘involvement’ through 
consultation and/or participation. This is seen as essential even though there will be 
tensions between appropriate forms of engagement and a perceived need for rapid 
progress.  
 
Much of this document is consistent with international scholarship seeking to   
identify the factors that contribute to, and promote, recovery and/or resilience in 
broad socio-political systems. The interface between the recovery agency – in this 
case the Waimakariri District Council – and ‘the community’ have been identified as 
being highly influential (Coghlan, 2004; Coles and Buckle, 2004; Cuthill and Fien, 
2005; Etye, 2004; Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2007; Murphy, 2007; Sullivan, 
                                                 
8
 There was good alignment between this  framework (developed by the last Labour government) and the Local 
Government Act (2002) which stated the purpose of local government is to:   
 enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, communities; and  
 promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of communities, in the present 
and for the future. 
However, the current National government’s Local Government Amendment Bill currently (as of Nov 2012) 
before the House replaces this with “to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality local 
infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions in a way that is most cost-effective 
for households and businesses”. 
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2003; Vallance, 2011; VBRRA, 2011; Waugh and Streib, 2006; Wilson, 2009; Zautra, 
Hall and Murray, 2009). In summarising much of this work, Hawkins and Maurer 
(2010) found that within group ties (bonding capital) was vital in terms of the 
immediate response but that connections between groups (bridging) and between 
groups and the recovery authority (linking capital) were important for resilience, 
longer-term recovery and neighbourhood revitalization.  
 
Whilst this helps establish the general terrain of enquiry, there is less information 
from disaster scholarship about recovery best practice and, unfortunately, many of 
the better-documented case studies exemplify what not to do or highlight problems 
implementing best practice. Davidson, Johnson, Lizarralde, Dikmen & Sliwinski 
(2007, p.100), for example, compared four case studies exhibiting different types of 
‘active’ community/state interface (or ‘participation’), from supplying the labour 
force at one extreme to taking an active role in decision-making and project 
management at the other. They found that having the opportunity to make 
meaningful choices led to more positive results but they also noted that ‘despite 
often-good intentions, this level of participation is rarely obtained and the 
[community’s] capabilities…are often significantly wasted’ (2007, p. 100). Along 
with Lawther (2009), who argued that this arises from demands for visible results 
which place time pressures on recovery authorities, Davidson et al. attribute this 
failure to the nature of the relationship between the community and formal 
recovery authorities. They note barriers to effective participation include a lack of 
trust; government’s reluctance to share power and lose control of the process; and 
recovery agencies using community ‘sweat’ as a proxy for engagement. 
 
MCDEM’s (2005) holistic recovery framework also recognises the type of 
community involvement should vary depending on the nature of the task, the type 
of disaster and its effects on the community, but suggests some of the most 
effective means of consultation in disaster recovery situations include public 
meetings, community representation on committees, and the inclusion of 
representatives from community organisations in decision making processes. 
However, little guidance is provided around the delegation of decision-making 
authority to communities or how to facilitate more active forms of participation in 
recovery. 
 
A common tool used to describe various community/state relationships and 
different forms of involvement is the IAP2’s spectrum of participation. Like 
Arnstein’s ladder and Pretty’s typology, the spectrum recognises varying levels of 
public impact (Figure 3 below) and may provide a useful, if incomplete, guide to 
different types of engagement. 
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Figure 3: The IAP2 Spectrum of participation (www.IAP2.org) 
 
 
In short, the CDEM Act (2002) supports the development of an integrated and 
community-based recovery framework, as did the Local Government Act (2002) that 
provided the broader legislative context through the earthquake sequence. There 
is, however, much room for variation in interpretation, and little specific guidance 
(based on recent, local examples) around what those responsibilities are, or how to 
achieve them in practice.   
 
To summarise thus far, the current recovery context is informed by certain themes 
or tensions. These are the:  
 
1. unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ 
recovery work with community at the centre, versus the lack of clarity around 
both community and local government’s role in disaster recovery; 
 
2. general consensus that good local government-community relationships are 
crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best 
to engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 
 
3. balancing Business as Usual with recovery issues.  
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Methodological Issues 
 
In August of 2012, Dr Suzanne Vallance from Lincoln University was commissioned 
by the council’s Recovery Manager to undertake an independent analysis and 
overview of the Waimakariri District Council’s ‘recovery framework’. This report 
documents the council’s on-going attempts to address post-earthquake issues and 
opportunities in a rapidly changing environment. It draws on an analysis of council 
documents (including Council Minutes and Agendas, communication strategies, 
reports), newspaper articles, website material and other secondary data sources. 
The report also draws on in-depth, qualitative interviews (conducted during Sept – 
Nov 2012) with 42 Waimakariri District Council employees (senior management and 
some frontline staff), elected members, and representatives from local NGOs, 
community groups, faith-based organisations and Residents’ Associations.9 These 
interviews usually took between 45 minutes and two hours, and were loosely 
structured. The format was usually one where the interviewee began with a 
chronological account of their role, and described key events, problems, initiatives, 
programmes and appointments. Most (but not all) of these interviews were 
recorded then transcribed, and analysed thematically. 
 
This qualitative approach, and the methodological foundations of this research 
project, are consistent with Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram’s (2012) exhortation to 
consider not just ‘which method’ but particularly ‘what matters’. This report 
therefore documents ‘an account’ of what was done, as well as in-depth analysis of 
some key elements and attidues underpinning the framework; that is, some key 
organisation aspects that ‘really mattered’ as the recovery process has unfolded.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Confidentiality issues mean the participants’ details cannot be detailed any further.  
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Section B: A Chronological Overview of Actions Taken by the 
Waimakariri District Council  
 
Pre-earthquake 
 Jim Palmer (CEO) regularly attends civil defence training exercises and 
nominates relevant staff members to relevant civil defence and emergency 
management roles. Brennan Wiremu is employed as Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Officer in July 2010 and prompts the CEO to 
appoint Simon Markham (Manager of Policy and Customer Service) as 
Recovery Manager ‘should the need ever arise’; however, no training had 
been given. Similarly, a conversation had taken place identifying Sandra 
James (Community Team Leader) as a potential key player in the council’s 
civil defence structure, but this conversation was in very early stages.  
 
 Connections with outside consultants, contractors, government agencies, 
NGOs and community groups/faith-based organisations cultivated by senior 
management/team leaders and elected members. 
 
 List of council assets including parks and buildings well-documented, 
mapped, and up to date.  
 
 A lifelines hazard assessment undertaken in 2009 which identified risks, such 
as areas prone to liquefaction, and recommendations to mitigate those risks. 
 
 Waimakariri District Council’s debt is described as ‘manageable’. 
 
Earthquake and ‘Response’ 
 
 Saturday 4th September, 4.36 am a 7.1 magnitude earthquake rocks the 
region. Some parts of the district – Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki – suffer 
liquefaction and lateral spread of up to 3.5 metres.  
  
 By 8 am, the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was up and running from 
council offices in Rangiora. At 10.03am the Mayor declares State of Local 
Emergency.  
 
 Despite it being a Saturday, there is a mass deployment of council staff 
members volunteer to go to ‘ground zero’ in Kaiapoi. Some go to restore 
services, others to provide, and gather, information, to ‘be present’ and 
reassure residents.  
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 A key decision is made to base some council staff members, including Sandra 
James (Community Team Leader who was initially there undertaking 
logistics/catering for contractors and volunteers) and Gary Boot (Utilities 
Manager) with consultants and contractors in the council-owned Kaiapoi 
community hall (the ‘blue building’) on Sewell Street, Kaiapoi. 
 
 Another key decision is made to feed the contractors and consultants in 
double shifts in the Kaiapoi community hall. These effectively become 
briefing sessions that greatly facilitate information flows.  
 
 
 Both civil defence and ‘lay’ volunteers, contractors and consultants start 
pouring in, but there is no SOP on how to manage this extra resource. A 
decision is made to assign volunteers to teams headed by council employees 
which rapidly increased capacity without losing local knowledge. 
 
 Another key decision is made to ‘step over the boundary’ and work with the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC) to restore services to the home, not just to 
the boundary as is required by law. It is seen as crucial that people be 
enabled to stay in their homes and, with the sewerage network obviously 
broken in places, 200 port-a-loos are ordered.   
 
 Building inspectors who had been working with structural engineers in 
Kaiapoi’s main street start working in residential areas. They use a similar 
‘placard system’ of evaluating a commercial building’s status as fit for 
purpose is applied to homes. This worked well in some respects but was also 
seen as an ‘opportunity lost’ in terms of gathering information about looming 
housing needs and issues. 
 
 The Welfare Centre opens, run by CDEM volunteers. There is immediate 
tension between these volunteers who associate welfare with ‘providing first 
aid, food, water and shelter’ and local NGOs who provide ‘peacetime’ 
counselling and others social services (including a foodbank) using a ‘case 
management’ approach.10  
 
 Monday 6th September, an Earthquake Recovery Management Team is 
established and meets with key agency representatives. Simon Markham 
assumes the role of Recovery Manager and begins engaging regional and 
central government representatives from EQC, MCDEM, MSD, DBH, HNZ, 
                                                 
10
 ‘Case management’ refers to a coordinated approach to service provision, ideally through one or 
just a few points of contact. It has been defined as ‘a collaborative process of assessment, planning, 
facilitation and advocacy for options and services to meet an individual’s holistic needs through 
communication and available resources to promote quality cost-effective outcomes’ 
(http://www.cmsa.org.au/definition.html). It stands in contrast to an approach where the individual 
identifies and chooses different service providers, for different issues, with little overall integration or 
coordination. This can lead to gaps in service provision and duplication of effort. 
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WINZ, etc. Other members of staff begin meetings with the Local Authority 
Protection Programme and other insurance providers. 
 
 At the Civic Offices in Rangiora, a meeting is called for Councillors, some staff 
members and other stakeholders from the Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (MCDEM); Ministry of Social Development (MSD); 
Wellbeing North Canterbury (WNC); Kaiapoi Community Support (KCS); 
Enterprise North Canterbury (ENC); Kaiapoi Promotion Association (KPA); and 
Kaiapoi I-site. They receive a briefing from the Civil Defence Controller Nick 
Harrison, and their roles and responsibilities become slightly clearer: Heather 
Warwick of Enterprise North Canterbury would head Economic Recovery; 
Tina Robinson (MSD) and Sandra James would jointly lead the Social 
Recovery Team and Waimakariri District Council would lead the Built and 
Environment Recovery Team. This meeting sends a strong signal that council 
will have to work with others from within the District and beyond to respond 
to, and recover from, these earthquakes.  
 
 Sandra James (Waimakariri District Council’s Community Team Leader) and 
Tina Robinson (MSD) call a community meeting to identify community needs 
and shape the recovery framework. This meeting was attended by more than 
80 representatives from community groups, government agencies and NGOs. 
Sandra James’ on-going involvement in the response and recovery is mooted, 
as is the need for a formal Waimakariri District Council ‘Social Recovery 
Manager’.  
 
 Councillors meet and approve the CEO’s request for unbudgeted expenditure 
which is ‘in the order of $150-200, 000/ day’ and rising, up to $3 million. 
Based on a very rapid appraisal of council’s infrastructure, building and 
recreation assets, a ‘guesstimated’ budget of likely damage/replacement cost 
and reimbursement of around $120 million from the Local Authority 
Protection Programme Disaster Fund (LAPP) and Central government is 
presented.  
 
 Council staff members who are not needed for the formal and fairly 
structured civil defence ‘response phase’ continue working in Kaiapoi and 
hand deliver over 2, 400 information updates to affected residents on a daily 
basis (see Appendix 1).  
 
 Enterprise North Canterbury, the partially council-funded organisation 
facilitating economic development in the district, is deployed to Kaiapoi to 
assess business and employer/employee needs.  
 
 Tuesday 7th, the Welfare Centre moves to the rugby club rooms and Sandra 
James formally takes on the role of Social Recovery Manager, based in 
Kaiapoi. She begins working with Tina Robinson from MSD on an approach 
that places people and communities at the forefront of the recovery.  
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 Thursday 16th September, utilities have been restored not just to the 
boundary but to people’s homes, though some services are provided using 
temporary arrangements. The Welfare Centres close and the State of 
Emergency is lifted. 
 
 The Earthquake Recovery Committee (ERC) establishes a panel of Councillors 
to interview applicants and oversee the distribution of grants of up to $250 
(as a general guideline) from the Waimakariri District Earthquake Relief Fund 
($25, 000) and Mainpower’s donation of $100, 000. The Mayoral Relief Fund 
retains its ‘last resort’ status. 
 
 Orders in Council under the Canterbury Earthquake (Local Government Act, 
2002) Order 2010 gives council the power to make significant decisions 
without undertaking usual consultative processes.  
 
 In a Progress Report to council from Jim Palmer on 21st Sept it is noted ‘the 
Recovery phase has commenced’ with priorities identified as: 
 
 Ensuring the wellbeing of our community; 
 
 Restoring or replacing Council’s damaged infrastructure and 
community facilities; 
 
 Providing leadership and planning for the restoration of the Kaiapoi 
town centre; 
 
 Processing building consents and other consents directly but as 
promptly as possible; 
 
 Establishing a Recovery Assistance Centre 
 
 In the same report, the CEO points out that while 5, 000 to 10,000 people are 
severely affected, the other 40,000 residents in the District have nearly 
returned to Business as Usual. Balancing these different considerations 
requires additional resources to fill capability gaps and some restructuring of 
council staff. It is also apparent that the ‘recovery’ will take longer than a few 
weeks. Consequently, Rob Kerr is employed on contract as Infrastructure 
Recovery Manager to oversee earthquake damaged areas; an appointment is 
required to take on some of Simon Markham’s role as Manager of Policy and 
Customer Service whilst he acts as Recovery Manager; and Sandra James’ 
role as Community Team leader is filled by a further secondment from within 
the Team. 
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Recovery 
 
October 2010 
 Working with local NGOs, in early October, Sandra James helps coordinate a 
transition from a Welfare Centre to a longer running Recovery Assistance 
Centre (the RAC) to be located in the blue building on Sewell Street, Kaiapoi. 
Designed to be a ‘one-stop shop’, those working in the RAC adopt a ‘case 
management approach’ of integrated service delivery. To achieve this, the 
RAC houses Work and Income New Zealand, the IRD, business and whanau 
support, psycho-social and pastoral care teams, a tenancy service, and 
council’s Building Unit and Community Team staff. Kaiapoi’s well-known 
head librarian Mark O’Connell (displaced by the closure of the library due to 
structural damage) is appointed to welcome RAC visitors.  
 
 Jan Stanaway, a consulting structural engineer who had undertaken the 
initial rapid assessment of council assets is seconded to Waimakariri and 
continues working with Craig Sargison in the Recreation and Community 
Services Department and the loss adjustor from Wellington. Together they 
walk around and assess whether council buildings had suffered 100%, 50%, 
10% or no damage. This enabled Ms Stanaway and the loss adjustor to build 
a relationship and “establish some common ground” very early on. They 
were also able to speculate about possible solutions and opportunities to 
improve these assets. A key decision was to add a ‘betterment’ column to 
the ‘replace and repair’ spreadsheet which included ideas and broad cost 
estimates. 
 
 Due to structural damage to their building, council’s Kaiapoi Service Centre 
staff also relocates to the RAC.  
 
 Local body elections are held and Mayor David Ayers is elected on a platform 
of pulling the District together to help the people of Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and 
Kairaki. 
 
 A series of evening meetings – under the rubric of New Foundations - are 
held with business owners and residents of Kaiapoi to outline council’s role 
and to invite discussion around ‘issues and concerns, as well as possible 
solutions’. A media release dated 4th October stated ‘The Council 
understands the need for leadership…and recognises that a revitalised 
Kaiapoi town centre will require a clear and coordinated approach’.   
 
 A temporary ‘book bus’ service replaces the Kaiapoi library which had been 
closed due to earthquake damage. ‘Temporary use’ as a legitimate recovery 
strategy takes shape.   
 
 A new formal management structure is developed that recognises on-going 
roles for Recovery, Social Recovery and Infrastructure Recovery Managers.  
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 Rob Kerr is employed by council as Infrastructure Recovery Manager and 
Tonkin and Taylor begin work on a land remediation programme. Then, “for 
efficiency and effectiveness reasons…and to minimise community 
disruption”, the council proposes that they project manager the programme 
of land remediation for EQC/government. A Memorandum of Understanding 
with EQC and the Crown is negotiated. 
 
November 2010 
 
 The newly created Earthquake Recovery Committee comprising the Mayor, 
all Councillors, and the Kaiapoi Community Board Chair convenes. 
 
 Council begins work on a public-private sector infrastructure and building 
‘Hub’ to co-locate with the RAC to house Fletchers (PMOs for $10-100K 
works) and other rebuild-related organisations.  
 
 Infrastructure Recovery Manager Rob Kerr seeks approval from the 
Earthquake Recovery Committee for the Procurement of Strategy for 
Earthquake Recovery.  The Strategy has the objectives of facilitating a quality, 
timely, speedy and efficient restoration of services to affected residents; 
coordination; and minimising the risk of disputes and risk to council. The 
Strategy also provides the opportunity for local and small contractors to play 
a significant part in the reconstruction process. A ‘unit rates’ approach is 
proposed to speed up the process, and enable greater control over the 
contracting process, whilst still maintaining a contestable price.  
 
 Council provides some funding to Enterprise North Canterbury for a 
marketing and promotions campaign to ‘kick-start’ economic recovery in 
Kaiapoi. 
 
 The Oxford Community Trust secures funding from MSD to provide social 
services ‘triage’ at the RAC. Those located at the RAC, including Sandra 
James, note ‘serious distress’ in the community and a growing awareness 
that there is a need for some kind of advocacy service, particularly around 
housing issues, insurance, tenancy and repairs. A Community Response Fund 
application is made to resource several temporary positions that would 
undertake advocacy around these issues, based on a case management 
approach.  
 
 Jeanette Ward, a consulting traffic engineer with experience in consultation 
exercises and streetscape design, is seconded to council. Consequently, the 
New Foundations rebuild of the neighbourhoods and Kaiapoi Town Centre 
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gathers momentum. A series of ‘street ideas’ BBQs are held, and drop-in 
sessions for community input arranged.11  
 
 The first Hub portacoms arrive on council-owned Darnley Reserve adjacent 
to the RAC.  
 
December 2010 
 
 The council’s New Foundations team launch a display of ‘community-inspired 
concepts’ for the Kaiapoi Town Centre at the Christmas carnival. In a media 
release dated 8th December, Trevor Ellis (Senior Planner) points out that ‘the 
land damage repair work still has a long way to go, but this is a unique 
opportunity to stand back and review Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki and 
the way it should be in future. It does give the community a chance to have a 
say in how to make positive changes for the future’.  
 
 Public meetings are held at the Kaiapoi High School to engage with those 
who have been impacted to give them a chance to ask questions and get 
answers. These meetings were themed around insurance, EQC, council 
services, etc. 
 
 The Mayor invites all Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki senior citizens to 
morning/afternoon tea ‘to have a cuppa’ and enable council to ‘listen to 
issues and concerns and answer as many questions as possible’.  
 
 Following a survey of Kaiapoi employers, it is estimated that 10 – 20 per cent 
of businesses in Kaiapoi have closed or will soon close. Enterprise North 
Canterbury seeks $950,000 from government for an assistance package for 
struggling businesses and receives about $20,000 to fund 0.5 of a co-
ordinator role. 
 
 With council support in the form of helping with funding applications, 
providing meeting spaces and communications, payroll, and so on, the local 
Darnley Club (with Chris Greengrass as Manager) secures funding (initially 
from the Community Response Fund) to extend the services, and number, of 
the Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service Coordinators. This team, 
headed by Jude Archer, becomes an important dedicated advocacy and 
recovery service, assisting local residents affected by the earthquakes. Each 
of the 10 coordinators undertakes a case management approach for about 
40 local residents, offering: 
o Help working out what needs to be done and making a plan;      
                                                 
11
The Waimakariri District Council’s Rebuilding Kaiapoi :Engaging With Our Earthquake Affected Community 
was a winner at the 2012 New Zealand Engineering Excellence Awards and took top honours in the 
Excellence in Community Engagement section.  
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o Providing information on grants and financial support; 
o Connecting people with services including budget advice, relationship 
and general counselling, targeted support for the disabled and 
elderly, women’s refuge, often through local providers like Kaiapoi 
Community Support, and local faith-based groups; 
o Coordinating meetings between people and experts/contractors. 
 
This case management approach works well but increasingly, residents begin 
presenting with complex issues around tenancy, insurance, and EQC. The 
nature of their work shifts from co-ordination of social services to advocacy. 
 
 A Memorandum of Understanding with the Crown is drawn up for council to 
formally project manage land remediation to enable the rebuild of about 1, 
200 homes in Kaiapoi, Kairaki and Pines Beach. Plans to expand what is now 
known as ‘the Hub’ in Sewell St, Kaiapoi even further are made so as to 
house additional rebuild-related council staff in portacoms adjacent to the 
RAC. 
 
January 2011 
 
 ‘The Hub’ located on Sewell Street in Kaiapoi opens. This means that in one 
small area of council-owned land, residents can find: 
o Waimakariri District Council’s Social Recovery Manager; 
o Waimakariri District Council’s Infrastructure Recovery Manager and 
his team of engineers/consultants and contractors who are designing 
and project managing the rebuild of infrastructure to support about 
1, 200 homes using a geographic ‘cluster approach’; 
o Other Waimakariri District Council staff members from the Building 
Unit to manage consents and inspections; 
o The 15 Earthquake Support Co-ordinators (10 FTEs) who assisted 
between 400 and 600 cases at a time in the first year; 
o Fletchers (PMOs for $10 -100K works) 
 
 The New Foundations Team publishes a booklet, 108 key questions and 
answers about earthquake recovery which covers community issues, council 
services, support, housing and rebuilding, geotechnical and land, and 
EQC/insurance. Question 14 is ‘Will our community survive this event – what 
is the council doing to encourage people to stay’? The answer provided is 
‘Kaiapoi is a strong and passionate community, and the Council is confident 
that the collective strength of the people…will ensure that the community 
survives the earthquake and its aftermath…The Council sees its role as to 
lead and coordinate the work of rebuilding Kaiapoi and to keep you informed 
as soon as we know when something is going on. The Council will also be 
helping groups getup and running again, organising community events and 
encouraging people to feel good about their community’. 
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 A further 7 formal meetings with affected residents are held, with about 150 
to 300 attendees each time. Council staff members meet regularly with 
Residents’ Association representatives. Workshops are held to obtain 
feedback on the Town Centre plan. 
 
 Council staff members devise a formal earthquake recovery public 
communication strategy, with the objective of encouraging a sense of 
community and delivering timely information to a) directly affected 
audiences, b) internal audiences, and c) District and beyond. 
 
 The Events, Pastoral Care, and Volunteer Support teams are established with 
support from council. These teams, administered through Wellbeing North 
Canterbury with funding from MSD, work with council and form part of the 
extended community engagement network. The Pastoral Care Team, for 
example, comprises one paid (part-time) employee who co-ordinates 
volunteers for a weekly door-knock in different areas. They have a standard 
questionnaire which assesses whether the home is safe, warm, dry; if they 
are aware of the Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service; and whether they 
have any questions for the council.  
 
 A temporary library is established in Kaiapoi just over from the Hub. 
 
February 2011 
 
 Councillors indicate a willingness to spend $1 million over and above the 
insured value to improve the Kaiapoi library and Service Centre and 
budgeted for an additional 50 per cent of floor space to be added so as to 
accommodate the museum in one integrated facility. Conversations around 
‘betterment’ begin. 
 
 Council establishes a working group to liaise with community representatives 
to figure out the best way council can help them. 
 
 As one example of how accessible council staff members are, on 4th February 
2011, a media release providing an overview of council’s progress to date 
concludes with an invitation to contact Jim Palmer, Chief Executive directly 
with further requests for information, and his telephone number and 
personal email address are provided. 
 
 Public consultation on the amended Town Centre plan begins on the 19th 
February. This engagement process is designed to further refine the Plan 
before it is presented to Council for adoption. 
 
 Sandra James (Social Recovery Manager) requests approval from Council of 
unbudgeted expenditure of $25,000 to initiate an Earthquake Recovery 
Community Development Support Service from March 1st to 30th June 2011. 
She also requests that Council endorse her application to Department of 
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Internal Affairs for a further $80,000 per annum to employ a Community 
Development Advisor for 3 years. Their work would focus on identifying the 
impact of the quakes on local service providers and the community they 
serve; assist communities in developing their own recovery initiatives; 
supporting both existing and emerging groups in building community 
resilience; and building strong partnerships between communities and 
support agencies. The community outcomes that are expected to come out 
of this include: 
 
 Community needs for health and social services are met; 
 
 Community facilities and services meet the changing needs of the 
community; 
 
 People are able to get the information they need; 
 
 There are opportunities for different age groups to participate in 
community and recreation activities; 
 
 People are supported by a range of health services; 
 
 Participation in community-based support services is encouraged. 
 
 On February 22nd a major 6.3 magnitude earthquake hits that, according to 
Professor Yeats, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Oregon State University in 
Corvallis, USA, would have ‘flattened’ most world cities.12 There were 185 
fatalities (most of these in two building collapses in Christchurch’s CBD), 
further liquefaction in the Eastern suburbs of Christchurch, and rockfalls in 
some hillside suburbs. The Christchurch CBD is described as ‘munted’ 
(Christchurch City Council Mayor Bob Parker).  
 
 The Waimakariri District Council establishes a Welfare Centre at, and with 
support from, the Rangiora Baptist Church for 400 people (largely 
Christchurch residents) by 8pm the following night. They secured blankets, 
sheets, pillows and food through a call out on the website and other media, 
and the council’s animal control facility was even used to accommodate 
people’s pets. This centre runs for 2 weeks, accommodating and assisting 
several thousand displaced Christchurch residents.    
 
 Although in a different district, the damage to Christchurch puts Waimakariri 
District Council’s recovery plans on hold due to shortages in building 
inspectors, insurance loss adjustors, EQC staff and contractors who have 
been diverted to the city to re-establish infrastructure lifelines there. It is still 
the council’s intention to resume the rebuilding of Kaiapoi housing as soon as 
                                                 
12
 www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-earthquake/4711189/Tuesday-quake-no-aftershock 
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possible; however, the rebuild plan, which was to be announced on the 22nd 
February, is delayed until the 22nd March.   
 
 Council oversees the Waimakariri Earthquake Relief Fund to distribute 
donations and monies received from individuals, businesses and 
organisations. Council also arranges a Waimakariri Working Bee for 5th March 
to clean up new liquefaction in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki.    
 
March 2011 
 
 In a media release central Government confirms that the land remediation 
and rebuild programme should go ahead in Kaiapoi as planned.  
 
 Consequently, council’s Kaiapoi Community Meetings for those most 
affected by the September quake, and the council-managed rebuild, resume. 
Council have divided the affected neighbourhoods into clusters and Mayor 
David Ayers sends an invitation to 1, 200 affected home-owners in Zone C to 
attend one of 6 public meetings. The meetings are designed to brief 
residents on the roll-out of the programme, a schedule of work (so people 
know roughly when they are likely to have their home rebuilt), and likely 
implications of the major construction work. Representatives from EQC, 
Tonkin and Taylor, insurance companies and PMOs also attend, along with 
Mayor David Ayers, either Jim Palmer or Simon Markham (as alternating 
MC), either Gerard Cleary or Rob Kerr (engineering presentation), and an 
MSD representative to talk about temporary housing.  
 
 Council’s New Foundations published a list of Q and As around the 
remediation and rebuild process. Jim Palmer and David Ayers issue an 
invitation to a follow up meeting with those who will be first in line to have 
their homes and streets rebuilt. A communications schedule is also devised 
so that ‘everyone understands the process’. 
 
 Submissions on the Waimakariri District Council’s Annual Plan are sought.  
 
 Concerns are raised about temporary accommodation while homes are being 
rebuilt. 
 
 Government announces the establishment of a new Government 
Department, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) to 
replace the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission (CERC). It is 
anticipated that ‘working collaboratively with the Government will achieve 
the best outcome for our community” (David Ayers, Media Release, 29th  
March). 
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April 2011 
 
 Council remains committed to land remediation and repair programme, New 
Foundations issue 137 key questions and answers about the repair, rebuild 
and land remediation process in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki.  
 
 Waimakariri District Council agrees to allow the Department of Building and 
Housing to put 2613 temporary housing units on Kaiapoi Domain.  Council 
also issues a call for expressions of interest from other landowners to make 
land available for further temporary housing.  
 
 The Kaiapoi Town Centre Streetscape plans are drawn up and displayed at 
drop-in sessions from 17-21 April and on the New Foundations website. The 
Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan consultation period then draws to a close. 
 
May 2011 
 
 The Kaiapoi Town Centre plans are adopted by Council. 
 
 Changes are made to the Building Code and the implications of liquefaction 
and lateral spread for building consents needs to be established.  
 
 The ‘silent earthquake’ begins to come to Rangiora in the form of partial 
closure of the Rangiora library as it is deemed earthquake prone. 
 
June 2011 
 
 The Annual Plan 2011/12 is released and notes a $28 million shortfall in the 
total cost of recovery which the Council will need to loan fund and recover 
through a rates increase of $60 in 2011 and $120 thereafter for 25 years. This 
will ensure that community facilities and infrastructure are repaired or 
replaced to the same or a higher standard. 
 
 Start work ‘cluster meetings’ of geographic household groups are held with 
the first residents to be affected by the imminent rebuild. 
 
 Kaiapoi Domain Village Open Home Weekend held (4th and 5th June) and 
temporary accommodation information sheet is put on the website. 
 
 The council prepares a detailed, 400 page Infrastructure Rebuild Strategy 
outlining the proposed repair and renewal plan. 
 
 9th June, Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee requests deferral of 
works. Consequently, the rebuild and remediation works which were to start 
the following week come to a halt. 
                                                 
13
 The final number of temporary homes was 22. 
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 Council designs a communication strategy to inform residents of the 
Minister’s deferral request and the reasons for it.  
 
 13th June: Another two earthquakes of 5.5 and 6 magnitude result in further 
liquefaction and there is further damage to infrastructure.   
 
 14th June, letters noting deferral of works are sent to affected residents. In 
these letters from David Ayers and Jim Palmer, it is explained that “further 
scientific analysis has shown there are more faults … than previously thought 
and scientists now suggest that the September quake may be more like a 
one-in-100 year event. This means for a building with an expected life of 50 
years, there is a 50 per cent probability that it will experience a quake like 
the one we had in September. That means any land remediation work and 
the design of building foundations need to be of a higher standard…It may be 
a number of weeks before we have this information”. 
 
 Council mobilises pastoral care teams into communities affected by this 
news, and starts work on the ‘Your Future, Our Place’ campaign. Council 
engages the Kaiapoi Baptist Church to host morning and afternoon teas, and 
community dinners, to bring people together and support each other. Over 
80 people attend the first dinner.  
 
 As a further follow up, the Mayor issues an open letter to the people of 
Waimakariri and council opens an Earthquake Recovery Drop-in Centre at the 
Hub, reminding people of the Waimakariri Earthquake Support Services 
there.  
 
 On 23rd of June Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee issues a media 
release outlining Kairaki has been zoned ‘red’. Residents are told that they 
will have 9 months to consider their options, one of which is a Government 
offer to purchase their home and land. Another option is to negotiate a pay 
out from the home-owner’s insurance company (if they have insurance). A 
third ‘option’ is to remain where they are which raises questions about 
council’s obligations to deliver infrastructure and services and the 
compulsory acquisition of land by the Crown.  
 
August 2011 
 
 Order in Council designates buildings with less than 33 per cent of standard 
strength as ‘dangerous’. In response, council approves $30,000 to undertake 
rapid assessments of council assets and develops an Earthquake Prone 
Building policy. This will have far-reaching implications for building-owners in 
Rangiora and the policy is put up for submission on the council’s website.  
 
 33 
 
 18th August the Minister for Earthquake Recovery announces further Red 
Zone decisions. Council arranges a community meeting to be held that 
evening. The Red Zones cover:  
approximately one quarter of properties (860) in Kaiapoi; 
about half of the properties (80) in Pines Beach; 
all properties in Kairaki; 
and 70 Kaiapoi properties remain orange 
 
 The housing market ‘suddenly goes mental’ and there are reports of rental 
and house/land package ‘price hikes’ as a further 5, 000 households across 
the Canterbury region are red-zoned.   
 
 A communications plan to liaise with affected residents and the wider 
community is developed.  
 
 Council begins transitioning from ‘Rebuild’ to ‘Retreat’ and Robb Kerr’s 
Infrastructure Recovery Manager contract is released to enable him to assist 
with CERA’s remediation programme.  
 
 Council begins to investigate subdivision potential around Kaiapoi. A quick 
analysis of subdivision, section/lot availability suggests a housing shortfall of 
about 900 homes (1, 200 Red Zoned, with only 250 lots available in 2011/12).  
 
 Some council staff begin working with housing and real estate developers to 
speed up the development of greenfield subdivisions and brownfield sites 
around Kaiapoi. CERA and representatives from the three TLAs meet to 
discuss land supply and the allocation of land for new housing within each 
District. Four developments around Kaiapoi are identified for fast-tracking 
and negotiations begin with Silverstream.  
 
 In parallel, council establishes an information hub with agencies invited to 
attend and meet face-to-face with residents. 
 
September 2011 
 
 Waimakariri District Council launches a series of community meetings with 
Red Zoned residents. The two main problems identified include a) the 
financial shortfall some owners will have if they take the Government’s offer 
and b) a lack of ‘affordable’ housing options around Kaiapoi.  
 
 Council issues 130 key questions and answers about red, green and orange 
zones in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki.  
 
 Council issues an Accommodation Survey to gauge the intentions of residents 
in Orange/green (n=152) and red-zones in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki 
(n=392).  This confirms that red-zoned residents believe they will have 
trouble finding housing within their price range if they want to stay in 
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Kaiapoi. Over a third indicated they would likely (or very likely) need 
temporary accommodation.   
 
 A Social Services Waimakariri mapping survey is conducted with 48 service 
providers so as to identify key current and future social needs in the district. 
Sandra James presents the results to the Earthquake Recovery Committee 
comprising Councillors and Kaiapoi Community Board Chair. Key trends for 
social service delivery agents include ‘burnout’ due to a) loss of staff and 
volunteers and b) increased workload due to rising case numbers, and c) 
increased complexity of cases. It is also noted that many mainstay funding 
sources have been diverted to earthquake recovery rather than business-as-
usual service providers. Risks to social service delivery were identified as lack 
of capacity and resource constraints, loss of strategic vision as services a 
stuck in ‘response mode’. Key community trends included a rise in domestic 
violence of 30 per cent, behavioural problems in children, ‘quake brain’, 
stress and depression from loss of community facilities. Looming needs 
included affordable, warm, safe housing, financial hardship, family 
breakdown, isolation and grief. Key community risks were identified as in-out 
migration causing loss of community, which would be amplified by the lack of 
community facilities, increased mental health issues, and continued ‘quake 
brain’ which inhibits people’s ability to think clearly. 
 
 
October 2011 
 
 A proposal for a further 18 (of possible 35) temporary DBH housing units to 
be located on Wylie Park goes to the Earthquake Recovery Committee but a 
4-4 division results and this item of business remains unresolved. 
Disagreement is expressed over council’s role in providing the land, with 
some indicating ‘government needs to consider relocating to private land’, 
others stating ‘it is council’s responsibility to look after their residents’. Still 
others maintain there is a duty to look after all residents by providing 
adequate greenspace rather than focusing solely on displaced residents.    
 
 Craig Sargison (Manager Community and Recreation) presents 
recommendations around seismic strengthening of council assets to the 
Earthquake Recovery Committee. He presents his Capital Programme to 
Council noting in the issues and options that ‘The Council is faced with 
unique situation in that the community has lost much of its heritage and 
community facilities and at the same time is poised on the edge of a period 
of unprecedented growth. Unfortunately, this growth has not yet 
materialised in the pragmatic sense of growth of rateable properties which 
places Council in the difficult situation of on the one hand realising what is 
needed to support a growing community of approximately 60, 000 people, 
but having in the short term a diminishing rating base. To achieve a sense of 
community and deliver the expectations of a community…residents require a 
visionary perspective in the sense that whatever buildings we create should 
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have a life expectancy of at least 50 years. The sense of community is not just 
created by large numbers of people living together…but rather by the way 
people interrelate with each other. So to create community the Council has 
an obligation to future generations to create facilities which will deliver a 
connected functional community’. A number of key projects are then 
presented including the Kaiapoi Aquatic Centre, Rangiora Town Hall, the 
Kaiapoi Wharf, Kaiapoi Library and Museum and Kaiapoi War Memorial 
Building at an estimated spend of $17, 648, 000. A longer list of smaller 
projects is then presented, along with seismic strengthening works.  
    
November 2011 
 
 Earthquake Recovery Minister uses his powers under Section 27 of the CER 
Act to enable a change to the Canterbury Regional Policy Statement, with far-
reaching implications for housing development.14 As a result, several 
residential subdivisions described as ‘limping through the Environment Court 
before the earthquake’ were given ‘the green light’. Consequently, 
Waimakariri District Council planners and senior management trial a 
concurrent rather than sequential subdivision approval process, and work 
with the Silverstream developers to condense a year’s work into a week to 
‘basically re-write the District Plan’.15 This frees up 550 house and 
land/sections for development; some of which are designed to accommodate 
smaller houses and units for elderly residents.  
 
 
December 2011 
 
 Mayor David Ayers sends a briefing paper to the Minister for Earthquake 
Recovery outlining key concerns. These include the need for an independent 
review around insurers’ offers where repair work costs seem understated; 
facilitating re-location and re-use of ‘good’ red zoned homes; uncertainty 
over future ownership/use of the Red Zones; growth challenges around 
traffic management to the City; inability to secure affordable insurance 
cover; and concern over Government’s decision not to extend the Red Zone 
offer to Council’s pensioner housing. 
 
 Waimakariri District Council, with ENC, CERA, and Maxim Projects, holds a 2 
day Housing Options Expo.    
 
 On December 23rd, another 6 magnitude earthquake rocks the region causing 
further damage to infrastructure and renewed anxiety for many residents. 
                                                 
14
 ‘Proposed change 1’ was incorporated into the 1998 Canterbury Regional Policy Statement as 
Chapters 12A and 22. These address land use and urban growth management in Greater Christchurch 
for the next 35 years and ‘provides statutory backing for the Greater Christchurch Urban 
Development Strategy’. Details are available on http://ecan.govt.nz/our-responsibilities/regional-
plans/rps/pages/proposed-change-no-1.aspx 
15
 District Plans must be consistent with Regional Plans.  
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January 2012 
 
 Simon Markham presents a ‘composite report’ from across the council to 
summarise the earthquake recovery programme which now includes a Red 
Zone Transition Management Plan. It is noted that 414 Red Zoned 
households are still ‘undecided’ over the Government’s offer; the 17 
Waimakariri Earthquake Support Coordinators are still working with 771 
households (with 184 closed cases); The Hub still coordinates appointment 
based access to a range of services around business support, community law, 
EQC, CERA, the Temporary Accommodation Service, insurance companies, 
Lumley’s construction, and Westpac/ANZ/BNZ banks; the temporary village 
has 17 of 22 units occupied; Red Zone demolitions have begun; and a Green 
Zone rebuilding programme is needed with implications of the Red Zone 
decisions for the Town Centre Plan under consideration. Key programmes 
include: the Green Zone Rebuild Programme; the Community Facilities and 
Reserves Rebuild and Restoration Programme, the Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan 
and Business Support Programme; Kaiapoi Urban Form and Accelerated 
Development Programme; and Community Engagement, Support and 
Regeneration Programme. 
 
 Jan Stanaway and Craig Sargison complete their evaluation of damage to 
council-owned buildings, along with the status of project works 
completed/needed. 
 
 A review of earthquake prone buildings results in the on-going closure of 
buildings in the main street of Rangiora. 
 
April 2012 
 Council begins work on temporary business accommodation on the main 
street of Rangiora with the shops located on the lawn in front of the civic 
offices. These temporary buildings are for local business displaced by building 
closures and will ensure a steady stream of foot traffic through High Street. 
The Christchurch Earthquake Appeal Trust contributes funding of up to 
$200,000 towards the temporary building accommodation with the rest 
(approximately $300, 000 after rentals) covered by Council. 
May 2012 
 
 A new infrastructure recovery plan is developed with work falling into 3 
categories: a) Minor repairs and straight forward work requiring little or no 
coordination, and not affect by Red Zone decisions, b) complex projects 
requiring coordination across stormwater, roading, water and sewer, not 
affected by Red Zone decisions and c) other projects of varying complexity 
that are affected by the Red Zone. These projects are prioritised according to 
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community benefit, ease of project delivery and optimal packaging of works. 
It is noted that the Infrastructure Recovery will have to work with the 
Communications Team on a consultation and information strategy. 
 
June 2012 
 
 A revised Kaiapoi streetscape plan is proposed which takes into account 
residential retreat from the red zones, and resultant residential and 
infrastructural development, including schools, to the west and north of the 
town centre.   
 
August 2012 
 
 Ken Stevenson recommends to the ERC that the Streetscape plans for Kaiapoi 
West and East (stage 1) and Pines Beach/Kairaki be released for consultation 
but that those for Kaiapoi South be held until more is known about the 
future use of the Red Zone.  
 
October 2012 
 
 Sandra James is seconded to Wellington City Council and Alison Bourn 
replaces her (until April 2013) as Social Recovery Manager. 
 
 A proposal goes to the Earthquake Recovery Committee for a Housing 
Working Group chaired by Recovery Manager Simon Markham to be 
established. It is anticipated that this group will have a short life span – until 
March 2013 – to undertake some specific tasks, primarily around the 
evaluating social housing provision, Council’s potential role in that, and 
facilitating transitions from social (rental) housing to ‘assisted home 
ownership’. The motion is carried though Councillor Barnett votes against it 
on the basis that there will be a cost to council in resourcing the Group, and 
that the responsibility for social housing provision and housing solutions lies 
with central government, primarily the Department of Building and Housing, 
and CERA.  
 
 The Housing Working Group’s first report to the Earthquake Recovery 
Committee shows awareness that there is a lack of clarity over council’s 
position on housing provision, specifically suggesting that Council reflects on 
its role as watching, seeking to influence solutions, or trying to ‘solve’ a 
number of related problems. Primarily, these include a shortfall between Red 
Zone payouts and the cost of available housing with low-equity seniors 
particularly disadvantaged and a lack of affordable rentals. A starting point of 
providing monitoring and advice, advocacy and coordination is suggested.   
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Section C: Lessons and Learnings - An Integrated, Community-
Based Recovery Framework 
 
Having provided a chronological account of actions taken by the Waimakariri District 
Council, this section outlines some lessons and learnings around three key issues: 
 
1. The unique positioning of local government to undertake integrated or 
‘holistic’ recovery work, versus the lack of clarity around local government’s 
role in disaster recovery; 
 
2. The general consensus that good council-community relationships are crucial 
to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best to 
engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 
 
3. The balancing of Business as Usual with recovery issues. 
 
In order to illustrate the integrated and community-based recovery framework’s 
resolution of these tensions, this section reports in more detail on three key areas of 
council operation. The first area concerns council’s integrative mechanisms, 
structures and functions, including positions and appointments made, steering 
groups and committees that formed, research and communications strategies that 
were developed, and so on.  The second area of operations addresses council–
community relationships; this theme is further divided into ‘communication’, 
‘engaging’ and ‘engaging with’ local communities. The third theme documents the 
on-going struggle to balance business-as-usual functions with recovery in the 
context of a wider, lengthy, and continually changing, recovery process.  
 
An ‘Integrated’ Framework 
In presenting the Waimakariri District Council’s Recovery Framework as ‘integrative’, 
an initial evaluation has to take place around what it is, that is being integrated. This 
section therefore speaks to questions around the scope, breadth and depth of 
council activities and community needs that were seen as being in need of a co-
ordinated approach. 
 
While councils’ roles during the ‘response’ phase of a disaster are covered by the 
CDEM Act (2002), at the time of writing (Nov, 2012), the responsibilities of local 
governments during ‘recovery’ are addressed, for the most part, under the business-
as-usual Local Government Act (2002). At the time of writing, New Zealand 
legislatively charges territorial local authorities with:  
 enabling democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, 
communities; and  
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 promoting the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of 
communities, in the present and for the future.16  
Some councils have a tradition of interpreting this in a very narrow sense focussing 
on the provision of the ‘core business of roads, pipes and rubbish’, whilst others 
include a range of economic and community development elements to their work. 
These variations in service provision are shaped by the mandate of elected 
Councillors and consultation with communities during the formation of councils’ 
Long Term Council Community Plans. Council’s selection of the CEO, who then 
employs other staff members, is also crucial in setting the tone of different TLAs as 
they provide advice to Council and give effect to their decisions.  
 
Waimakariri District Council is positioned at the more ‘inclusive’ end of the spectrum 
and their services and functions extend beyond ‘pipes, roads, and rubbish’ to include 
provision of community and recreation facilities and some social (public) housing.  
As a medium-size council Waimakariri does not provide all its services using in-house 
resources. Instead, they have chosen to work with a range of external consultants 
and contractors to deliver or support both core and extended services. Through 
collaboration and engagement with others in the District (such as Enterprise North 
Canterbury and Wellbeing North Canterbury), Waimakariri District Council is 
involved in a diverse range of cultural, economic and social services. As a couple of 
examples, both Mayor David Ayers and CEO Jim Palmer are on the Board of 
Enterprise North Canterbury which undertakes business, employment, tourism and 
lifestyle development in the District. Another NGO who works with council - 
Wellbeing North Canterbury - provides Kaiapoi Community Support, Emergency food 
assistance, school holiday programmes, free legal advice, volunteer drivers, Otautahi 
Women’s Refuge, Nurse Maud, Meals on Wheels, Strengthening Families, 
Community Youth Workers, a Truancy service, Youth Drug and Alcohol services, 
family counselling, Karanga Mai Early Learning and some special courses, like yoga. 
 
This extended network meant that even pre-earthquake, council had an established 
‘architecture of engagement’ (Simon Markham) that connected council to the wider 
community. Council also already had a number of formal integrative functions and 
structures already in place, across a range of sectors, industries and service 
providers. Importantly Waimakariri District Council also has a system of very good 
informal networks (‘we’re a friendly bunch’) that facilitate communication across 
different units and promotes an integrated approach to service delivery. Described 
by an external consultant as ‘well-functioning organisation’ it was also pointed out 
that the number of people who ‘make the calls’ are a fairly small group who are well 
aligned in their thinking. This means that those external partners, including 
contractors and consultants, are able to deal directly with those decision-makers 
and engage with council at the ‘right level’. 
                                                 
16 The Local Government Amendment Bill currently (Nov 2012) before the House has replaced this 
section with “to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality local 
infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions in a way that is most 
cost-effective for households and businesses.”  
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Given New Zealand’s governance history, the CDEM Act which charges local 
government with certain responsibilities during disaster response, and Waimakariri 
District Council’s breadth of core and extended services (provided either in-house or 
through collaboration with others), it is not surprising that the community looked to 
council for leadership and co-ordination post-earthquake. However, the earthquakes 
have added a whole raft of additional issues and considerations, many of which have 
no established precedent – such as the provision of temporary accommodation – 
but that still need to be resolved quickly. This means that the ‘peacetime’ integrative 
structures and processes have had to be augmented with a host of others. The 
following examples give a sense of the new social, economic and 
engineering/geotechnical scope of activities that Waimakariri District Council has 
tried to co-ordinate following the earthquakes so as to provide an integrated 
recovery strategy.  
 
The first example emerged during the response phase and concerned the 
distribution of large amounts of donations and funding that came in within a few 
days of the earthquake. Jeff Millwood, Financial Manager, explained that within a 
week council was caretaking over $200,000 worth of donations and had Councillors 
approving applications for up to $500 at a time. Yet, as he explained, Councillors 
actually have a great deal of experience in that area and were well-equipped to 
administer the distribution of funds. A more permanent panel was established 
subsequently to oversee the Waimakariri Earthquake Relief Fund which gives out 
discretionary amounts of about $250, depending on the circumstances. Unlike the 
Red Cross grants, this fund localised and the application process is a little simpler.   
 
The second, rather more convoluted and challenging, example concerns land supply 
and housing affordability. This lies at the other extreme of council matters in that it 
is more controversial (what is local government’s role in housing provision) and 
complex given the issue spans TLAs, government departments (including CERA), and 
the private sector including real estate developers. That being the case, post-quake 
land supply and housing affordability issues demanded (several) new organisational 
structures and integrative mechanisms. Some examples included: 
 A liaison group that met with geotechnical engineers to evaluate land 
stability; 
 A new process around Project Information Memorandums (PIMs) that 
convey this information to the public 
 Various committees and steering groups comprising representatives from 
neighbouring TLAs to, for example, provide consistency around the 
‘temporary accommodation’ that people needed either immediately or while 
they rebuilt;  
 The RAC, the Hub and the inter-departmental Hub Operations Group that 
met weekly; 
 The Waimakariri Rebuild Co-ordination Group that met with ex-District 
rebuild partners; 
 New Foundations; 
 The Recovery Manager position; 
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 Other groups that evolved to facilitate land supply comprising 
representatives from CERA and other Urban Development Strategy partners, 
and real estate developers along with Waimakariri District Council’s Simon 
Markham, Craig Thompson, and council planners.  
 
To further illustrate the complex stories behind these examples, one senior planner 
described the many processes and factors that needed to be integrated around 
geotechnical assessments and land supply as including, first, the red zoning decisions 
and the geotechnical reports that were needed before any further development 
could go ahead. Next, assuming the geotechnical reports were positive, an 
enthusiastic developer had to be found. Then, land/developer availability had to be 
assessed against broader regional growth management which meant liaising with 
others (including SDC, CCC and CERA) outside the district. Finally, the usual process 
of subdivision development, which can take years under normal circumstances, had 
to be fast-tracked. Consequently, most of those chosen for fast-tracking were those 
already some way through the process of re-zoning but delayed by some issue. In 
total, this narrowed the selection from about 109 in the first instance to four, 
including Silverstream in Kaiapoi. In this particular case, the development ended up 
being quite different to the plan change that the council had just approved in that it 
went from 450 residential lots to 1115. 
 
Following on from this, one of the more recent and again, controversial (vis-à-vis 
local government’s role in social/public housing and housing generally), 
developments designed to integrate and coordinate housing availability is the 
Housing Working Group. Indeed, the Group’s first report to the ERC shows 
awareness that there is a lack of clarity over council’s position on housing provision 
and, therefore, the Group’s purpose. Against this background of consensus that 
there is a ‘housing problem’, but dissent over whose problem it is, the Group has 
suggested a starting point of monitoring and advising, advocacy and coordination.   
  
A third example of this council’s recovery activities post-quake pertains to business 
and employment in the District. Though the focus was initially on Kaiapoi (where the 
main street was cordoned off for a week, with 25 per cent of local businesses 
affected, and the immediate closure of several major employers), the closure of 
earthquake prone buildings has more recently impacted on Rangiora’s main street 
as well. The implications for council are summarised in the Waimakariri’s Local 
Economic Development Strategy (2012) Towards a Prosperous Economy. The result 
of collaboration between the council and Enterprise North Canterbury (ENC), the 
executive summary states: 
 
The Strategy recognises the private sector makes most of the key 
decisions affecting Waimakariri’s economy. However, Council’s 
regulatory, service provision, infrastructure and influencing functions 
means we have a crucial role to play in the District’s economic future.  
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The priority actions outlined in the strategy centre on transport and communication; 
regulatory process and performance; business land management; and business 
retention and attraction.  
 
With this kind of interest in economic development, working with ENC, council 
undertook or supported a range of business recovery initiatives. One of ENC’s first 
priorities was to establish the commercial and trading damage to Kaiapoi and 
produce a Business Survival Toolkit. Later, their objectives were based around a) 
business recovery and b) promotion of Kaiapoi in partnership with the Kaiapoi 
Promotions Association to deliver, for example, the SHOP Kaiapoi campaign.  
 
ENC, with council’s support, applied for funding for a business recovery co-ordinator, 
Pete Vink. One of his first tasks was to undertake a survey, or capability assessment, 
of the various businesses in Kaiapoi so as to establish their needs, assess what 
support might be required, and work with that information to help businesses get 
back up and running. The role meant helping business and employers through 
training, bridging insurance applications, connecting with mentors, and so on. One 
of the larger projects was inspired by Peter Kenyon’s visit to Kaiapoi, which was 
sponsored by the Kaiapoi Baptist Church. His ‘asset-based recovery’ model inspired 
the promotion of an automotive cluster market where business owners developed 
an awareness of each others’ services and supplies, and collectively marketed these. 
The idea was “While you’re getting your dents fixed, why don’t you get a wheel 
alignment from ** next door as well?” Partially funded by MSD, one of the business 
recovery co-ordinator’s other objectives was specifically to connect employers and 
employees; however, the general benefit from his work was around ‘connecting, 
networking, coordinating and facilitating’. 
 
Another, rather more controversial, business support initiative was the temporary 
business accommodation established on the lawn of the Civic Offices in Rangiora 
(Figure 4 below). This pop-up mall, based on Christchurch’s Restart model, involved 
an outright cost to council of about $300, 000 (after rental recovery, with an 
additional $200, 000 from the Christchurch Earthquake Appeal Trust). The 
temporary buildings were set up for local business displaced by building closures 
with the hope of maintaining a steady stream of foot traffic through the High Street. 
The cost was deemed justified because the main street was in danger of losing its 
viability as a shopping destination and community focal point. 
 
 
 43 
 
 
Figure 4: The Temporary Business Accommodation in Rangiora 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Temporary library in Kaiapoi located near the Hub 
 
A final example demonstrating the scope of activities council has tried to integrate 
over the past two years is, of course, infrastructure and other physical resources, 
including many facilities used by the community (see, for example, Figure 5 – the 
temporary Kaiapoi library). During the response phase, council had had great 
success at rapidly restoring services and many of those facilities through co-
ordination and rapid feedback loops developed ‘at the coal face’ in Kaiapoi. Besides 
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co-location, two additional components contributing to this success were a) feeding 
the contractors in 2 shifts which brought everyone together for briefing sessions and 
b) assigning volunteers or ex-district workers to a team headed by a local which 
allowed council to ‘rapidly add capacity without losing control over the process’. 
Their success during the response phase probably contributed to the decision to 
take to project manage the (then) infrastructure rebuild of Kaiapoi’s damaged 
suburbs (later Red-Zoned) and town centre, and integrate this with the provision of 
other community facilities. 
 
Having made the decision to take responsibility for the infrastructural rebuild 
project, Rob Kerr was hired as Infrastructure Recovery Manager who would work 
with Simon Markham as Recovery Manager. Rob Kerr also began working closely 
with Social Recovery Manager Sandra James, in Kaiapoi, at the Hub in the same 
portacom with a connecting door between them. Importantly, council also 
established a Hub Operations Group to meet weekly, comprising representatives of 
the main insurers, Fletchers, Social Support Co-ordinator team leader, some 
government agencies/departments, and relevant council staff including the Social 
Recovery Manager, Infrastructure Recovery Manager, Building Unit Manager, 
Earthquake Communications Advisor, Land Remediation Project Manager. This 
group met to strategise around the rebuild specifically. A Waimakariri Rebuild Co-
ordination Group was also established, to meet fortnightly, with representatives 
from council (including the Community Facilities Manager), Insurance, EQC, 
Geotechnical consultants, Housing New Zealand, and Enterprise North Canterbury. 
This group met to integrate the rebuild with broader district and regional recovery 
issues. The decision to project manage the rebuild, the co-location at the Hub and 
the willingness to broker between different groups allowed a far more informed, 
responsive, co-ordinated and efficient approach. 
 
These few examples across funding, land supply and housing, business and 
economic development, and infrastructure are an indicative rather than exhaustive 
list of council’s recovery activities. Other areas of work that were either created or 
intensified as a result of the earthquakes included processing of geotechnical 
information, building consents, the community team’s work around road safety, 
injury prevention, safer communities, structural assessments of privately-owned 
earthquake-prone buildings, planning and policy considerations, and so on, not to 
mention the extended hours involved in meeting representatives and agencies 
outside the District, including CERA, other TLAs, etc. So, while it is true that a pre-
earthquake integrative ‘architecture of engagement’ existed, it has had to be 
significantly up-sized to include new responsibilities, issues, programmes and 
agencies.   
 
This has been made possible by the several higher-level changes to the organisation 
structure. The first of these is the Earthquake Recovery Committee comprising the 
Mayor, all Councillors, and the Kaiapoi Community Board Chair. This committee 
meets monthly and decides on specific earthquake-related issues. While the minutes 
show good levels of consensus on many issues, as noted above, the temporary 
village location and support for temporary business accommodation in Rangiora 
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were quite controversial. Nonetheless, this Committee has generally been able to 
work together and reach consensus around important recovery decisions, like 
project managing the infrastructure rebuild of Kaiapoi. The functioning of this 
Committee is informed by close connections with the wider community, and 
Councillors are generally well-known – and accessible - to people in the District.  
 
 
The second key integrative mechanism pertains to the council’s recovery structure 
(Figure 6 below) which includes the role of Recovery Manager, currently Simon 
Markham, who reports to Jim Palmer, CEO. Other key roles that characterise the 
recovery structure are Manager Social Recovery (currently Sandra James) and 
Infrastructure Recovery Manager (previously Rob Kerr). While a number of these are 
reporting relationships, most are collaborative in nature. This ‘paper’ structure is 
reflected in the actual work environment with the Social and Infrastructure Recovery 
Managers sharing a port-a-com at the Hub in Kaiapoi.  
 
Simon Markham describes the role of Recovery Manager as involving: 
 a blend of planning and policy; 
 operational management capability; and  
 relationship management. 
 
He liaises with the infrastructure planning and finance managers of council, works 
closely with Sandra James around social recovery, and maintains relationships with 
agencies, organisations and individuals beyond the District, including the CCC, 
CERC/CERA, insurers, UDS, PMOs, Ministers and Government Departments, the 
media, etc.  Simon Markham expressed some reluctance to define his role too 
tightly, arguing that although there is an important skill set around the planning and 
policy/operational management experience/relationship management the job 
description needs some flexibility. The extended earthquake sequence has meant 
that the role has changed as the recovery unfolds and the nature of his work has had 
to evolve to address those changes. The risk around this approach is that it requires 
very high levels of trust, stability, maturity, goodwill and a common understanding 
of the organisation’s core purpose. As a check and balance, a close working 
relationship with the CEO is required. The personal qualities of the Recovery 
Manager also need some elaboration; Simon was described by those who work with 
him as ‘having big ideas’, ‘a good networker’, ‘very capable’, ‘incredibly smart’, 
‘warm’, ‘energetic’ and ‘just fantastic to work with’.  
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Figure 6: The different Waimakariri District Council's 'recovery' roles/relationships 
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To summarise, the earthquakes have placed additional demands on a council that 
already interpreted their legislative responsibilities quite broadly. Though this put 
certain expectations on council, their history of good relationships with consultants, 
contractors and communities, and broad experience base, also meant the 
organisation had a pre-existing extended, functional and integrative ‘architecture of 
engagement’ and was able to rise to the challenge.  
 
‘Engaging’ and ‘Engaging With’: A Community-based Recovery 
Framework. 
The recovery literature exhibits high levels of consensus around the value of 
engaging communities post-disaster, yet there are very few exemplars detailing 
‘best practice’. Indeed, much of the recovery literature either highlights ‘what not to 
do’ or advises on ‘what to do, but not how to do it’. ‘Peacetime’ scholarship devoted 
to participation (Arnstein, 1969; Pretty, 1985; the IAP2) is of some limited utility. 
This suggests a continuum of engagement/participatory practices ranging from 
‘token’ or ‘passive’ informing though consulting, involving and collaborating, to 
‘meaningful’ or ‘active’ empowering (www.iap2.org). Though helpful, these tools 
assume a certain stability that is at complete odds with the post-disaster context 
which is characterised by more rapid and intense change. The post-disaster context 
therefore shapes state-citizen relations in ways more commonly associated with 
nascent democracies in less developed countries. This is because traditional lines of 
communication and ‘formal’ engagement processes may be suspended and need to 
be augmented with other means, and there is so much to do that recovery agencies, 
including local government, cannot actually achieve it alone.  
 
 
This serves as preamble to a necessary distinction between: 
 ‘engaging’ communities where non-governmental organisations and civil 
society groups assist in the delivery of services; and  
 ‘engaging with’ communities through re-establishing/augmenting electoral 
mandate through consultation, collaboration and empowered forms of 
participation in decision-making processes.  
  
This section documents some of the Waimakariri District Council’s processes, 
strategies and programmes of both engaging, and engaging with their local 
communities. 
 
Engaging the community 
Pre-earthquake, Waimakariri District Council had a dedicated Community Team led 
by Sandra James. They also ‘hosted’ Social Services Waimakariri (providing 
workspace and payroll, but did not directly fund), and contributed financially to 
Wellbeing North Canterbury (WNC, www.wellbeingnc.org.nz) who, in turn, assists 
Kaiapoi Community Support. Through these different networks, over many years, 
council staff members (including Sandra James) had built good relationships with the 
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wider community. Importantly, on the 4th September many of these were ready and 
willing to lend a hand.  
 
A similar level of competence and ability were demonstrated in Christchurch, but in 
the Review of the CDEM Response to the February 22nd Earthquake the authors note 
problems with the CDEM structure which impeded recognition of different 
community groups’ efforts post earthquake. In short, the report acknowledges that 
although ‘welfare provision’ is included, there is no recognised pathway for 
gathering or using community intelligence and services. The Review suggests ‘A 
template should be developed in Christchurch for a simple structure to link 
community organisations to the official Response. It would involve training or 
exercising (perhaps annually), plans for resourcing and a strong arrangement for 
liaison with the EOC post-event’ (McClean, et al., 2012, p. 180).   
 
A clash between CDEM’s standard operating procedures, and making the most of 
various non-CDEM communities’ competencies, was also evident in Kaiapoi after the 
4th September quake but it was dealt with rather differently. The Welfare Centre 
opened in the afternoon, and was initially located at the North Kaiapoi School. It 
hooked into the formal EOC in Rangiora through the standard CDEM structure but, 
as one interviewee noted there was a complete misunderstanding of what ‘welfare 
needs’ actually are. Though the CDEM welfare model encompasses provision of 
food, water and shelter, there is little guidance around psycho-social needs and 
wider community support for those with little experience, networks or contacts in 
this area. Much of the training around welfare was either confined to ‘basic needs’ 
or theoretical with the result that the CDEM model was operating independently of 
‘spontaneous’ community-based efforts. Thus, in an unfortunate case, a truckload of 
donated food and drink was returned to sender because the CDEM Welfare Centre 
had adequate supplies. Meanwhile the local foodbank – an established local 
institution that people turned to ‘spontaneously’ - was vastly under-resourced, but 
unable to connect to, and work within, the CDEM structure.  
 
That the CDEM response could make much better use of local communities’ 
strengths, and council’s connections with those communities, had been recognised 
before the quake. As Brennan Wiremu (Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Advisor) explained, this was part of the reason he had advocated for the Community 
Team to have a formal nominated CDEM role, and had initiated discussion around 
that several weeks prior. The Community Team is ideally situated because although 
they do not necessarily perform or run social services, they have connections with 
social services, and a big part of their role is developing very close working 
relationships with the various agencies, organisations and community groups within 
- and beyond - the district. Though the provision of food, water and shelter cannot 
be neglected, Welfare Centres are the natural CDEM home for broader concerns 
around ‘wellbeing’, and the Community Team has the necessary skills to administer 
this.   
 
Indeed, the Community Team leader - Sandra James – had, in fact, been sent to 
Kaiapoi; however, her formal role was ‘logistics’ which included catering for the 
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contractors at the Community Centre on Sewell Street. So, right in the thick of it, and 
already well-known to local community organisations, she began hearing about 
some of the problems the ‘basic needs’ approach, and lack of community 
engagement, was causing. Some NGOs, for example, were concerned that some of 
the ‘counselling’ provided by volunteers was causing harm. She was also hearing 
that people who were already well-known to community-based social services were 
taking advantage of welfare services and becoming unhealthily dependent.  
 
According to one community group representative interviewed for this report, the 
Welfare Centre did indeed cater for those with genuine need, who were simply 
traumatised and/or poorly prepared for the event. There were, however, some 
Welfare Centre visitors who ‘saw the Centre like some kind of lolly shop’, whilst 
others ‘should have been having their broader needs assessed using a 
comprehensive and co-ordinated case management approach but were sent off with 
a food parcel’. Tension began to grow between the CDEM volunteers who were 
trying to run the Welfare Centre according to CDEM best practice, and local NGOs 
who believed the CDEM approach was contributing to, or exacerbating, broader 
social problems. 
 
When the decision was made to move the Welfare Centre from the school to the 
rugby club, Sandra James was able to assist with the move though, officially, it was 
still CDEM’s responsibility and she was not yet formally appointed to the leadership 
role. She was, however, able to mediate some kind of uneasy truce between the 
CDEM volunteers and NGOs/CSOs but tensions remained. As she outlined, while the 
CDEM model deals well with food, first aid, shelter and meeting basic needs, this 
kind of event, where housing is severely impacted, causes a range of interconnected, 
complex and complicated problems. So, as one interviewee described it, “we found 
out that they were having landlord issues, like their landlord had ripped the red 
sticker off their house and said ‘you’re fine to stay in there’, even though there was 
a big gaping hole in the wall. There were child custody issues, there were huge 
financial issues because they’d used extra resources. So we found that people who 
were already fragile were tipped right over the edge”.  
 
The identification of broader, interconnected problems led to the development of a 
case management system which a) ensured the right data were collected to 
adequately assess a range of people’s needs and b) make sure people were 
connected to the support they needed from local community services, government 
agencies, and NGOs, including the Red Cross.  
 
The transition from the CDEM model to the case management approach using their 
own data collection form was developed by Sandra James and others in the Social 
Recovery Team from MSD, and NGOs like the Oxford Community Trust whose core 
business is social support. It was this case management approach that was adopted 
when the CDEM-led Welfare Centre closed and re-opened as the Recovery 
Assistance Centre (RAC) in the council-owned Kaiapoi Community Centre on Sewell 
Street. 
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The RAC was a response to the obvious need to move from basic welfare provision 
to a more holistic form of recovery. But, although the council’s Community Team 
were the obvious choice to run it, Sandra James still had some concerns about 
maintaining a distinction between providing services and co-ordinating, facilitating 
and enabling service delivery. In her view, there were many government agencies, 
NGOs and community groups with great expertise in delivering services, but that 
some strategic thinking was required around co-ordinating those services, and 
identifying/filling any gaps. This led to a round of conversations – facilitated by 
Sandra James - with others outside of council, such as government agencies like 
WINZ and Housing New Zealand, faith-based communities and NGOs, including 
Wellbeing North Canterbury, and others that deliver social services during 
peacetime.  
 
Thus, the RAC came to host a range of government and community-based service 
providers, co-locating in the one building with council staff members who had set up 
a temporary council service centre. The latter were there processing, among other 
things, building consents for temporary repairs. With council services, NGOs and 
community-based social services, government departments (e.g. the IRD and HNZ) 
the benefits for residents of having a local one-stop shop quickly became apparent.  
 
Some principles underlying the development of the RAC included working with local 
service providers as much as possible17 and, often, enabling rather than doing. As a 
member of a faith-based community group told me, ‘Sandra would always be there, 
asking what we needed. She’d just quietly go away and get what you need, without 
fanfare’.  
 
 
Figure 7: The RAC later became the Hub - A One Stop Shop 
                                                 
17
 Note a similar principle was embedded in the engineering procurement of works strategy which 
highlighted a role for smaller, local contractors. 
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A good example of this at a large scale pertains to the establishment of the 
Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service (WESS). A local, Jude Archer, was 
appointed to the RAC’s advocacy desk and it became apparent over the next few 
weeks that there was going to be ongoing need in the community for social services, 
but also mediation and advocacy around tenancy and insurance. The RAC, however, 
was due to close before Christmas and this, it was believed, would leave a real gap. 
Their collective observation – supported by the recovery literature - was that it was 
becoming necessary to transition to a longer-running service, led not by council, but 
by a local group.  
 
Though need for a more enduring, community-based service was apparent, it was 
not immediately obvious where the service should be based, nor who could/should, 
run it. There were questions about what ‘local’ meant in this instance. Though the 
damage was largely confined to Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki, the council’s civic 
offices were located in Rangiora, a 10 minute drive to the west. Convinced that ‘we 
needed to be here with the community, accessible and available and visible’, council 
decided to invest in, and support, a base to be located in Kaiapoi.  
 
Another question was who would run the service, given the broad consensus within 
the council that it was time to hand over some of the recovery services and 
functions to the community. The Darnley Club, which provides care for the elderly, 
was managed by Chris Greengrass. She was well-known to the Kaiapoi community, 
‘had a whole lot community stalwarts on their Board’ and ‘deep roots into Kaiapoi 
itself’. Thus, it was seen as the perfect NGO to umbrella an advocacy and earthquake 
coordination service. With Sandra James’ help on the funding application, and a 
commitment to help with payroll and ‘whatever else we could’, Chris Greengrass 
and Jude Archer applied to, and received funding from, (initially) the Earthquake 
Relief Fund for 10 positions across 17 people, for one year.  
 
Another consideration was the type of person that would be required for such a 
role, and the difficulties involved in hiring for a one year contract. Another factor 
was balancing their qualities and qualifications, with the former seen as more 
important. Instead of relying on secondments from government agencies and 
departments, the Waimakariri Earthquake Support Service Co-ordinators were often 
asked to apply for the role based on their strong links to, and knowledge of, the 
community. The result is that rather than a service run by qualified social workers, 
Waimakariri has teachers, nurses, builders, and roading engineers, all of whom are 
highly attuned to broader community needs and, because they are locals, have a 
vested interest in achieving a good outcome for their clients. While this has its 
benefits, at times it has been a challenge to meet MSD’s expectations around 
following certain processes in what is, essentially, a temporary government 
department operating in a complex, rapidly changing and often tense environment.    
 
This Waimakariri District Council has supported the Service in important ways. They 
still operate out of the council-owned Hub and liaise regularly with the Sandra James 
and others. It’s likely that this relationship has given communities and funders some 
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confidence in the service, and their connection ensures good information flows, 
trouble-spotting and trouble-shooting. Though formal weekly meetings, and 
numerous informal chats enabled by this co-location, looming issues and needs can 
be identified and responded to more rapidly than would otherwise be the case.   
 
There are numerous other examples of Sandra James and other council staff 
members drawing upon knowledge of, and appreciation for, community assets and 
strengths but it is difficult to convey just how subtle some of this work has been. 
One example illustrating just how unconventional, but effective, some of their 
community ‘engagement’ has been is evident in this account from Tracy Pirie 
(Kaiapoi Baptist Church). She told me how the day before the Red Zoning decision 
was released: 
They [the council] rang me the day before, and they worded it really 
carefully. They said ‘look, there’s going to be an announcement’ 
and they asked me to organise gatherings, and to ask the Churches 
to organise gatherings for the next four weeks because they 
realised that there was going to be a need for people to gather…So, 
the first thing we did was to do an evening meal because 
communities are about families and we need to provide something 
for families.  And we did a Thursday evening meal for a month and 
then I we found out that everybody wanted it to continue…And it’s 
been going a while now and, you know, a few weeks we had Jim 
Palmer the Chief Executive, and Sandra and Clayton Cosgrove and 
Kate Wilkinson and three of the community board members come 
and serve dinner. And Sandra, for our first birthday, got the Mayor 
to come and Sandra came and Karen came, and they brought up 
birthday cake. And look it’s really nice for our people to come to see 
that.   
 
Whether it’s counselling, advocacy, establishing a welfare or pastoral care service, 
where possible council engages, delegates to, or works with, local groups who 
deliver these services.  
 
The question raised by Davidson et al. (2007) is whether or not this is a case of a 
recovery agency using community ‘sweat’ as a proxy for engagement. Based on 
these in-depth interviews with 8 representatives from different NGOs and faith-
based community groups in Rangiora and Kaiapoi, the answer would have to be ‘no’. 
Indeed, there is a strong sense that council, with Sandra James as Social Recovery 
Manager, located in Kaiapoi, struck a good balance between delegating to, enabling 
and supporting local services and groups.18 This approach recognised the value of 
these NGOs, CSOs and faith-based organisations, and enabled them to be 
instrumental in shaping their own recoveries. The opportunity to make a valued and 
meaningful contribution has been shown in the literature to be highly cathartic. 
 
                                                 
18
 Note a similar principle was embedded in the engineering procurement of works strategy which 
highlighted an important role for smaller, local contractors. 
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‘Engaging with’ the community  
Given the plethora of decisions, developments, opportunities and challenges that 
arise in the wake of a disaster a Council is faced with two broad choices around 
community engagement: The first assumes that through established electoral and 
legislative processes, local government has the mandate to make decisions and act 
in the interests of the people (a top-down approach). The second makes similar 
assumptions around electoral and legislative process, but recognises people’s needs 
and aspirations may change very rapidly after a disaster. ‘Engaging with’ the 
community acknowledges the need to augment the traditional electoral and 
legislative mandate local government already has with other means (a bottom-up 
approach). Waimakariri District Council has, over the last two years, undertaken a 
range of formal (e.g. submissions on the annual plan and LTCCPs) and less formal 
engagement processes and programmes with the people of Kaiapoi and beyond; this 
report focuses on three themes in particular with the first being their general 
communications strategy, the second the New Foundations programme, and the 
third the Rebuild of Kaiapoi.  
 
Communications  
On Saturday the 4th of September 2010, the earthquake’s effects were distributed 
very differently across the district. Some, indeed many, people were largely 
unaffected. Others, however, were without power, telephone, water or sewerage, 
and some had to flee their homes almost immediately.  
 
It became known over the course of the day that damage was largely confined to 
Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki, and that there was a need to keep residents as 
informed as possible. Unfortunately, however, the council’s Communications 
Manager was away on holiday. So, recognising the need to get information out to 
residents about the scope of the disaster, what was being done and where to go for 
help, the CEO Jim Palmer assembled all available staff members in the cafeteria for a 
briefing, and asked them to help distribute – by hand – the newsletter with useful 
information (Appendix 1). This was repeated twice a day for the next week, then 
three times a week for a period thereafter. 
 
By Monday, the planning team was helping enforce the cordon at each end of the 
main street, but also, as one staff member described, ‘helping members of the 
public, and so obviously being a very close and visible face down there [in Kaiapoi]’. 
She recounts the many questions residents were asking about the sticker system, 
the sewer, water, storm water, and where they could go. Because it was not always 
possible to answer their questions, the staff decided to take notebooks and note 
people’s question, their name and cell phone number so that they could text them 
the answer because text messages were far easier and faster.  
 
This process of communicating with the public continued, as did the strategy of 
committing to finding answers if they weren’t immediately known. Some of these 
burning questions were conveyed to local Member of Parliament Clayton Cosgrove. 
He held a number of public meetings (attended by 400-1000 people) where those 
questions, and (some) answers, were conveyed to the community. 
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Over the next few weeks, and once the initial rush was over, the process of 
communication became more streamlined. The Communications Manager also 
returned from overseas leave and started working on a formal engagement strategy 
around recovery that would recognise different communication needs. The key 
objectives of the strategy were: 
 
 Relevant, timely, understandable, comprehensive information that is easily 
available to all audiences during earthquake recovery; 
 
 Reinforce and encourage a sense of community; 
 
 Provide signposts to practical help. 
 
To achieve these objectives, the strategy identified different channels of 
communication for different purposes, including public meetings (with directly 
affected parties) to mail drops, newsletters, media releases, noticeboards, and 
advertising (for audiences beyond directly affected zones). Along with the ‘how’ and 
‘who’, the strategy also addresses ‘when’ and ‘where’ questions.  
 
Importantly, authorisation was given to employ a dedicated Earthquake 
Communications Co-ordinator, Kate Pierson who commenced work on the 21st 
February, 2011. As part of this strategy, the New Foundations website was launched, 
designed to be the council’s virtual one-stop shop, with ‘deep’ linkage to rebuild-
relevant content (www.newfoundations.org.nz). This appointment initiated a 
programme of communications activities over several channels that persists into 
2013. 
 
In the meantime, many ‘informal’ conversations were going on all the time. As Peter 
Jenkins, president of the newly-created Kaiapoi Residents’ Association reported: 
 
Jim Palmer would come to many of our meetings, and just sit in the 
back. And whatever you wanted he would, if he could provide it, he 
did. And he’d say ‘ring me up if there’s a problem, ring me up if 
there’s a concern’ and he could see those things that we needed 
fixed.  
 
Similarly those located at the RAC in Kaiapoi were continuously sharing, and bringing 
in, all kinds of information. Through these channels, a need was identified for, on 
one hand, life to return to normal as quickly as possible and, on the other, some 
light hearted relief. Consequently, Sandra James worked with Wellbeing North 
Canterbury to apply for funding for a part-time Events Co-ordinator. Although 
‘events’ might be seen as unusual way of ‘engaging with’ the community, others 
have noted how, post-disaster, communities often have to re-form and re-build 
before they can begin to participate in dialogue about the future (Vallance, 2011).  
Consequently, as Teresa Stevens (who took up the position) described it, the initial 
idea was that some community events should be held that were fun, affordable, 
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local, and that anybody could attend. Because they had lost their restaurants, the 
movie theatre, the skatepark, the pools, the library, their rowing club and so on, 
people weren’t able to go out as much and this was compounding anxiety and stress 
in the community. 
 
By late September a series of more formal meetings was deemed necessary. Gary 
Boot (Utilities Manager) gave a public presentation on sewer and storm water issues 
affecting about 200 homes on the 30th September. He explained the main problems, 
what council were going to do about it, and how long it would probably take.  
 
Overall, the council’s communication and engagement strategy has changed as 
circumstances dictate, but according to Sandra James, certain principles have stayed 
the same. These are: 
 
 Social recovery and physical infrastructure progressing side by side 
and putting people and ‘community wellbeing at the centre of the 
programme’; 
 Developing local responses to local need; 
 Showing leadership and coordinating different tasks, including 
knowing who is responsible for what; 
 Honest community conversations to deliver good news and bad news; 
 Working with what’s in the community; 
 Building genuine partnerships; 
 A readiness and willingness to engage with and communicate face-to-
face. 
 
Evidence for this is that over the first 15 months of response and recovery, 
approximately 11, 000 attendances were recorded at community meetings in 
Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki. Council staff at the meetings reported being 
unprepared for people’s thirst for information, nor the community’s appreciation of 
these direct ‘town meetings’ style of engagement. 
 
To summarise, different arms of the council have communicated in different ways to 
ensure the medium and message match as closely as possible. ‘Bad news’ is 
delivered in conjunction with a pastoral care package, and complex/complicated 
information is conveyed in a number of different ways, usually including public 
meetings with extended Q and A sessions. Further, the council’s presence in the 
community allows information to go back to the organisation in a timely way, and is 
often used to cross-validate other data sources.  
 
New Foundations: Rebuilding Kaiapoi’s Town Centre (KTC) 
 
From September 2010 through February 2011 Canterbury continued to be rocked by 
an extended series of ‘aftershocks’; however, the general understanding was that 
these would diminish in magnitude and frequency and the decision around 
rebuilding affected parts of Kaiapoi was never really questioned at this time. Under 
the rubric of New Foundations, Kaiapoi property owners and businesses were 
 56 
 
invited to ‘join in planning where to from here for the town centre’ by attending one 
of two evening events in early October.  
 
 
After an introduction from the Mayor, council staff members outlined how the 
quakes have impacted on the town centre plan that had already been underway, 
business accommodation options, the extent of damage to buildings and utilities. An 
‘open mic’ session was then held with questions and (sometimes) answers, with 
break-out sessions focussing on what council could do to help. Less formal sessions 
(including those where elderly residents were invited to chat over a cup of tea with 
the Mayor) augmented the more formal workshops and presentations, and all the 
while, the Earthquake Support Co-ordinators were ‘keeping their ears to the 
ground’, liaising with community leaders and representatives, and meeting regularly 
with Sandra James at the Hub. Just before Christmas, the council’s New Foundations 
team launched a display of ‘community-inspired concepts’ for the Kaiapoi Town 
Centre at the Christmas carnival. 
 
On the back of these varied engagement processes with Kaiapoi residents and 
business owners, 8 key issues were identified around the Williams Street Bridge, the 
Bridge Tavern site, the Town Square, Raven Quay West, Williams Street, street 
improvements, the Western Precinct, and design guidelines. These issues formed 
the focus of the draft Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan where some solutions were 
proposed. This draft – using a blend of artist’s impressions and photographs of the 
sites under discussion - was released for public consultation in February, 2011 (see 
Figure 8 below).19  
 
 
Figure 8: An example taken from the 2011 (pre-Red Zone decision) KTC consultation document 
 
                                                 
19
 Many of the Waimakariri District Council’s consultation documents and plans (including the draft 
KTC) are available on http://www.waimakariri.govt.nz/your_council/lets-talk/closed-
consultations.aspx  
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On the back of residents’ comments, the Kaiapoi Town Centre Streetscape plans 
were drawn up and displayed at drop-in sessions from 17-21 April and on the New 
Foundations website for further comment. These plans were then approved by 
Council in May 2011.   
 
New Foundations: Rebuilding Kaiapoi’s Neighbourhoods 
 
The most severely damaged areas had been identified and geotechnical engineers 
had devised a process of land remediation to stop lateral spread, augmented with a 
ground compaction procedure designed to stop liquefaction. Many of the homes on 
this land were damaged to the extent that it would be uneconomical to repair them, 
and would have to be rebuilt. It was on this basis that council – with Rob Kerr as 
Infrastructure Recovery Manager - undertook project management of the whole 
process so as to co-ordinate land remediation, infrastructure repair and 
replacement, and the rebuild of over 1, 000 houses.  So, during October 2010, 
another series of meetings also began with affected residents from Kaiapoi, Pines 
Beach and Kairaki.20  
 
At about this time, Jeanette Ward was seconded to council based on her experience 
as traffic engineer and background in urban design and project management. She 
had worked before with Waimakariri’s Roading Manager and he knew she could 
combine the technical elements of the job with good consultation processes. In 
January/February, working with Rob Kerr (Infrastructure Recovery Manager) and 
Sandra James (Social Recovery Manager), Jeanette Ward drew up some options that 
were ‘formative, without being too firm’, and these were presented at public 
meetings for community feedback. At these meetings, community members were 
invited to talk about ‘what you think of your streets and what changes you would 
like to see as part of the redesign of the damaged streets…Council is seeking 
feedback …to inform the detailed design work to be undertaken in the coming 
months’. Issues that had already been identified included the need to: 
 
 Calm traffic and enhance street legibility;  
 Discourage boy racers; 
 Widen footpaths; 
 Plant trees; 
 Distinguish cul-de-sacs from through roads; 
 Include a pedestrian crossing at Williams Street; 
 Improve the Williams Street intersection.  
 
Residents were shown a series of slides (also available in pamphlet form) which gave 
residents an idea of how some of these concerns might be addressed through 
streetscaping (Figures 9 and 10 below). 
 
                                                 
20
 It is unclear whether this strategy was used at these meetings, but at some point, at public 
meetings, residents of each street were encouraged to sit together (by putting the street names at 
the end of rows of chairs). This helped residents of each street get to know each other and cross-
reference and prioritise certain issues. 
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Figure 9: Streetscaping ideas from the New Foundations Rebuild Kaiapoi Plan 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: New Foundations Rebuild Kaiapoi Plan format 
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On the back of this, more detailed plans drawn up. These were then taken out for 
further consultation at public meetings and at ‘drop in’ sessions held in a portacom 
in Kaiapoi, with a bbq lunch provided.21 As Jeanette explained, this ‘two-step 
process’ is considered best practice because, if you do less consultation, you are not 
doing the community justice. While in cases, the TLA has done more, and 
undertaken workshops where people draw up their own plan, it is labour intensive 
and time consuming. The two-step process adopted in Kaiapoi ‘enabled us to meet 
the timeframes of the rebuild in an inclusive way, without dragging it out forever’. 
 
At the same time, residents whose homes were to be rebuilt were invited to a 
presentation explaining the land remediation process, including the perimeter works 
to prevent further lateral spread, EQC and their land damage liability issues, and 
land improvements outside the perimeter works. These issues were covered 
alongside other concerns residents had around temporary accommodation, noise 
and safety, and so on.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Rebuild sequence for residential areas 
Most important for many residents were the indicative timeframes accompanying 
the works schedule. The logic behind the schedule was explained simply; 
remediation had to take place in such a way that we didn’t ‘paint ourselves into a 
corner’ so the homes further back would have to be done first. It was this schedule 
that allowed people to start making decisions about the next two years, and for 
some, the news was good; they were first in the queue. For others the news was not 
                                                 
21
 Both Mayor David Ayers and CEO Jim Palmer attended on the Saturday. 
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so good as the schedule meant their homes would not be rebuilt for 2 years.22 Yet, 
as one resident told Sandra James, ‘I don’t like it, but at least now I know, and I can 
get a plan’. On the back of meetings around this issue, and some residents’ concerns 
about the process, New Foundations issued 137 key questions and answers about 
the repair, rebuild and land remediation process in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki. 
 
Even the earthquake on the 22nd of February that devastated parts of Christchurch 
city initially caused only a small pause in council’s commitment to the rebuild.  
Behind the scenes, however, serious insurance problems were just beginning. 
Initially, the problems raised were around apportionment of damage between the 
two earthquakes. As EQC was responsible for the first $100, 000 of damage, if the 
quakes were considered two separate events, EQC would be responsible for $200, 
000. This suited the insurance companies, but not EQC. The debate between the two 
is on-going.  
 
The second serious impediment to the rebuild programme going on behind the 
scenes was central government and the insurance industry’s general calculations 
surrounding durability of works and the likelihood of experiencing another event of 
these magnitudes. Largely unaware of the potential deployed to  
significance of the analysis and geotechnical investigations going on, Waimakariri 
District Council carried on with the rebuild programme. In late May, tenders for 
works using unit rates had been secured. A final series of meetings was held with 
residents of the first of the rebuild clusters to sort out any last minute concerns 
around temporary housing and timelines. On June 10th, Simon Markham even gave a 
briefing to CERA, Ministries and Business Leaders’ Forum outlining the rebuild 
programme and schedule of repairs.    
 
Machinery was already being deployed to the first sites when another earthquake of 
magnitude 6.3 hit the region and on June 13th Minister for Earthquake Recovery 
Gerry Brownlee issued a media statement Red Zoning Kairaki. It was conveyed that 
scientific analysis had been conducted and further faults found. This meant that the 
September quake was more like a 1-in-100 year event. Consequently, for a building 
with an expected life of 50 years, there was a 50 per cent probability that it would 
experience another quake like the one in September. Thus, any land remediation 
work and the design of building foundations had to be of a higher standard and for 
some areas, including Kairaki, the cost of doing so was too high.  
 
Council had very little warning of this announcement but ‘engaging with’ the 
community turned sharply from making sure the residents understood the rebuild 
process to facilitating a pastoral care programme, delivered mainly through the 
Earthquake Support Co-ordinators, local faith-based community groups, and the 
broader pastoral care team.   
    
All in all, the Waimakariri District Council has undertaken a rather varied process of 
‘engaging with’ different communities using a mix of fairly orthodox measures, and 
                                                 
22
 Working closely with Wellbeing North Canterbury, those getting ‘bad news’ also had a visit from 
the pastoral care team and some baking.  
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others less so. Mary Sparrow, Senior Policy Analyst at the council described the 
Policy Team as ‘survey junkies’ who are always looking to get feedback from the 
community and keep in touch. Yet, this ‘formal’ engagement complements a 
broader programme of connection with different communities that takes place at a 
different level. This story from Peter Jenkins (Kaiapoi Residents Association) is fairly 
typical: 
There is a very good understanding on behalf of the majority of the 
community that the Council understood the community’s needs 
and the community, that it was shared with the community so the 
community were engaged with in different ways… I can remember 
sitting down at the beach with Simon Markham, sitting down there 
under the trees, having a cup of coffee at Dave’s place and going 
through preliminary draft plans of how they were going to 
remediate the community infrastructure and the sections, and 
feeding into that. It was real kitchen table stuff. And it was about 
Simon Markham, Jim Palmer, Rob Kerr and Sandra James and Jude 
Archer’s team doing those things out in the community. 
 
It is evident in stories from all the non-council NGO and faith-based community 
representatives interviewed for this report which, given they are in a position to be 
most critical, makes a convincing case that the council’s varied and sometimes 
unorthodox process of ‘engaging with’ communities is an excellent model to follow 
in a post-disaster situation.  
 
Business as Usual versus Recovery 
The section details some of the considerations, processes, appointments and 
strategies the Waimakariri District Council have used to balance Business as Usual 
(BaU) with Recovery. In contrast with other TLAs that were either not affected to a 
significant extent, or whose leaders chose not to deviate from BaU, Waimakariri 
District Council essentially abandoned – or at least suspended – peacetime 
structures when the Mayor declared a State of Emergency at about 10.03 Saturday 
4th September 2010. This declaration was reinforced with messages from the CEO 
about dealing with requests to step outside one’s ‘normal course of work with good 
grace’. It was certainly an unusual situation where, during the first few days, team 
leaders, team members and elected members were deployed to Kaiapoi to make 
sandwiches or walk the streets delivering pamphlets to bewildered residents.     
 
A key departure from BaU was that Simon Markham who had so recently been 
nominally appointed Recovery Manager ‘should the need arise’ suddenly found 
himself centre of the organisation’s recovery effort and leading the newly created 
Recovery Management Team (Figure 12 below).   
 
Though this Recovery Management Team put some structure to the changing 
situation, within a week, council’s peacetime functions began demanding attention. 
So, although the disaster recovery literature (e.g. MCDEM’s Holistic Framework for 
Recovery, 2005) makes some neat distinctions between the natural, built, social and 
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economic environment, it was impossible to maintain these given the reality of 
overlapping and interconnected issues, such as building damage and closure causing 
economic and employment problems.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: The council’s initial recovery structure Sept 2010 (week 1) 
 
 
Nor did the literature adequately account for the sudden lack of autonomy council 
had over the situation, arising from the need to engage with CDEM Group, other 
TLAs, insurance providers, LAPP, Loss Adjustors, secondments, EQC, emergency 
services). As Recovery Manager Simon Markham explained: 
 
It became pretty clear early on that the event was of such a scale and 
geographic spread that, in the context of this council, we would not 
have the resources to duplicate or replicate BaU and create a 
dedicated recovery management operation because most of our 
teams in this organisation we can count on one hand. And there’s a 
huge amount of organisation specific knowledge sitting in the heads 
of a few people. And that’s a key dependency of a small to medium 
sized council. So we weren’t able to say to somebody in the utilities 
team at a sufficiently senior level ‘we can release you completely 
from your day job to do this recovery’.   
 
Thus when BaU and Recovery came together, the overall picture started to look 
rather more confusing and by October 2010, council had already devised its third 
version of the organisation’s operational and functional arrangements (Figure 13). 
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Increasingly, the council senior management team had to think about both 
capability and capacity, and how to resource the extra demands brought about by 
the earthquakes. These demands were felt across the organisation, from the injury 
prevention strategy ‘which changed immediately to suicide prevention’, and 
customer service who were trying to understand new geotechnical information on 
the PIMs, to the building unit which was dealing with an increased consents load. 
Another consideration was that the Civic Offices were in Rangiora whilst the damage 
was primarily in Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki, 15 minutes drive away. Finally, it 
was thought at the time that the earthquake was a one-off event which meant a 
reluctance to permanently increase the staff.  
 
 
 
Figure 13: The council’s recovery structure (V1.3, week 6) 
 
These considerations led to secondments, a new focus on tendering processes using 
unit rates, targeted funding applications for short-term appointments undertaken in 
collaboration with selected NGOS (e.g. ENC or WNC), parallel rather than sequential 
consenting processes (which has been facilitated by the move to digital copy), and 
the use of remote agents for consents processing. Through these means, for 
example, the building unit has increased the number of consents for new dwellings 
this year by 47 per cent from 2011 which, in turn, saw an increase of 100 per cent on 
2010.    
 
Some organisational restructuring also had to take place. As just one basic example, 
the new focus on ground conditions with assessment lodged on the Project 
Information Memorandum (PIM) has led to a more careful scrutiny of the PIMs. Pre-
earthquake this was undertaken by customer service staff whereas post-quake this 
work is done by two new technically qualified staff. Technical meetings are now held 
every two weeks with the discussion and findings minuted for future reference, to 
avoid variation in interpretation. An extra person has been hired to deal with 
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administration and another 3 to 4 are on–call to deal with overload and backlog. In a 
break with tradition, building inspectors are also now allowed to work overtime.  
 
The various infrastructure units have also been restructured and, in some cases, 
upsized to streamline engineering capacity around the ‘retreat’ to new greenfield 
subdivisions, with a new steering group and reporting structure forming to co-
ordinate that. While it would be ideal to add both capacity and capability, funding 
constraints make this impossible so, with some exceptions, the strategy has been ‘to 
do more with less’ in an effort to manage rates increases. The exceptions are the 
Hub in Kaiapoi, the addition of the Infrastructure Recovery Manager Robb Kerr 
during the rebuild phase, and the on-going roles of Recovery Manager, currently 
Simon Markham (who has also retained some of his Policy and Customer Service 
Manager duties), and Social Recovery Manager, Sandra James. Overall, in making 
decisions around resourcing, the balance between building (and losing) capacity and 
filling capability gaps is fundamental.  
 
 
Short duration across large 
geographic area but only one council 
unit affected.  
 
Requires cross boundary co-
ordination and appropriate planning 
structures. 
 
BaU + liaison team  + possibly added 
capacity  
Long duration, widespread and severe 
damage. Affects across all council’s 
economic, social, engineering and 
environmental units. 
Requires cross boundary and national 
co-ordination and appropriate planning 
structures. 
Suspension of BaU + liaison with 
national/regional recovery/private 
sector + added capacity and capability 
Localised event affecting small 
geographic area and only one council 
unit. 
 
BaU + diversion of spare in-house 
capacity. 
Severe but localised event across a 
number of council units.  
 
Hybrid BaU + Recovery capability and 
capacity. 
 
National assistance possibly required. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Simon Markham’s (Recovery Manager) Contexts for Recovery (Modified by Author) 
 
This has led Simon Markham to consider the different types of disasters that might 
occur and the most appropriate blend of BaU and Recovery functions councils might 
expect (Figure 14, see also Appendix 2).23 An important point to note is that there 
are vastly different contexts for recovery, and this context – also taking into account 
capability, capacity and culture of council - must shape any response and recovery 
                                                 
23
 Simon Markham has, in the interim, refined and developed these contexts for recovery and 
developed a checklist for pre-event recovery planning and management. A synopsis and the checklist 
in presented in Appendix 2.  
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strategy. Because only parts of the district have been affected, some BaU must take 
place. Yet, the extended and prolonged nature of the earthquake sequence means 
‘recovery’ is still incomplete. Consequently, the Waimakariri District Council is 
working with what might be called a ‘hybrid’ model that takes this blend into 
account. 
 
Two years on, there are a number of major challenges looming for both the council 
and district including the development of a withdrawal strategy for Kaiapoi and the 
closure of the Hub; dwindling funding streams both for earthquake recovery and 
business as usual social services which still report high demand; the ‘silent 
earthquake’ associated with the closure of earthquake-prone buildings which has 
severely affected Rangiora’s main street; and fatigue. In the face of these challenges 
it is easy to forget to celebrate some of the things that went very well. This section 
started with three key themes: 
 
1. The unique positioning of local government to undertake integrated or 
‘holistic’ recovery work, versus the lack of clarity around local 
government’s role in disaster recovery;  
 
2. The general consensus that good council-community relationships are 
crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how 
best to engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 
 
3. The balancing of Business as Usual with recovery issues.  
 
Waimakariri District Council has enjoyed some success across each of these, and this 
adds some support to the long-standing New Zealand tradition, and resultant, 
expectation that local government will show leadership before, during and after 
disasters. It is difficult to see any other agency possessing the local knowledge that 
helped make Waimakariri District Council’s Integrated, Community-based Recovery 
Framework so successful. They’ve been innovative both around engaging and 
engaging with some very competent local communities at various stages of the 
process and have judged finely some important distinctions between doing, 
delegating, supporting and enabling. The council’s size – not too big and not too 
small – has fostered good adaptive capacity and contributed to a responsive - and 
responsible - recovery framework.    
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Section D: What mattered for an integrated, community-based 
recovery 
Strong, focussed but distributed leadership 
When asked what helped make the Waimakariri District Council’s Integrated 
Community-based Recovery Framework successful, most of those interviewed (both 
in and outside of council) at some point mentioned Jim Palmer, referring to the 
Council’s CEO. There was general agreement that he had taken Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management seriously before the earthquakes, had assumed 
responsibility and showed initiative during the response phase, and had 
demonstrated excellent leadership since. His leadership style is not that of 
‘command and control’ often demonstrated during and after disasters; it appears to 
be more enabling with interviewees indicating “he’s present, but not in a controlling 
way” or “he’s supportive”. As one staff member put it: 
 
[One of his] attributes is he’s just a magnificent problem solver, given 
a complex problem, he’ll ask all the right questions to understand 
what are the contributing factors before arriving at a list of potential 
options, course of action. And then weighing up the pros and cons of 
each of those to determine the best course of action, so just simple 
problem solving. But now having experienced the Waimakariri’s 
performance through two huge earthquakes, a range of complex 
issues emerged out of those. And the way he dealt with those was as 
a forward leader, to be seen up the front doing what you ask your 
staff to do. 
 
However, this style of leadership did not dis-empower the staff, so although no-one 
doubts who is ultimately Chief Executive, decision-making authority is distributed 
throughout the organisation. As one staff member noted: 
 
I knew was walking into an organisation here at Waimakariri 
where leadership was being practiced and delivered at the 
lowest levels and it reflects on the performance of the 
organisation and the subordinate staff as well as managers that 
Jim has under him.  I think the way they perform, and the way 
all the staff in this Council perform, is a direct reflection of his 
personal contribution to the organisation.   
 
The effect of this is that for important decisions, everyone knows who to go to, and 
this policy is promoted by what appears to be a fairly open-door policy; however, 
less critical issues can be resolved very quickly at other levels. This has greatly 
facilitated the recovery process.  
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Alignment between the CEO Jim Palmer, senior management, Mayor David 
Ayers, other elected members (including Community Boards) and local 
communities 
It could be argued that the Waimakariri District Council’s Recovery Framework arises 
from an arrangement where the whole is more than the sum of its parts. So while 
consensus over Jim Palmer’s leadership is high, so too is agreement that the 
recovery reflects relatively good alignment between the Mayor David Ayers and 
other elected members (including Community Boards), and local communities, the 
CEO, and senior management. There is broad agreement around the Council’s core 
purpose which was articulated by many of those interviewed as involving the 
wellbeing of the community and meeting community needs, whilst being fiscally 
‘conservative’. So, with a couple of notable exceptions, there has been a relatively 
low level of conflict over Council’s roles and responsibilities, and what they should 
be doing. Though not everyone is entirely satisfied with their performance, and 
there have been some vocal critics, the Council’s approach has generally resonated 
very well with the expectations of the NGO and community group representatives 
interviewed for this research.   
 
Social capital 
It has been argued that bonding capital (within groups) helps people survive and 
respond to a disaster, but that good bridging (between groups) and linking (between 
groups and the state) capital is required for recovery. The Council and local 
communities have worked very well together with Council both engaging, and 
engaging with, local community groups and providers, consultants and contractors. 
Pre-earthquake Sandra James (former Community Team Leader, now Social 
Recovery Manager) had a good understanding of, and warm working relationships 
with, many local social service providers like the Oxford Community Trust, Kaiapoi 
Community Support and faith-based communities, and this enabled a very rapid 
integration of community and council recovery strategies. Where possible, Sandra 
James would identify and, if necessary, enable a local group to fulfil a particular role, 
thereby ensuring the community took an active part in the recovery.  
 
Sitting alongside this ‘engaging’ of local groups to do recovery work is the process of 
‘engaging with’ which speaks to different ways of augmenting the traditional 
electoral and legislative mandate local government already has. Given the plethora 
of decisions, developments, opportunities and challenges that arise in the wake of a 
disaster a Council is faced with two broad choices: The first assumes that through 
established electoral and legislative processes, local government has the mandate to 
make decisions and act in the interests of the people (a top-down approach). The 
second makes similar assumptions around electoral and legislative process, but 
recognises peoples’ needs and aspirations may change (rather rapidly after a 
disaster) and initiate a range of other consultative (surveys, submissions) and more 
or less deliberative and inclusive processes as well (a bottom-up approach). The 
Waimakariri District Council has relied heavily on the latter, and has developed a 
wide range of both formal and informal ways of engaging with local people, groups 
 68 
 
and businesses to help identify problems and issues, and develop workable 
solutions.  
 
These processes of ‘engaging’ and ‘engaging with’ promote flows of social capital, 
information and resources, all of which have been referred to as ‘the currencies of 
recovery’. These flows were facilitated by the principles of ‘presence’ and ‘co-
location’ best illustrated by the building of the Hub – a one-stop recovery shop - on 
Sewell Street in Kaiapoi. The Hub is a highly visible example of a more subtle pre-
earthquake process involving the development of – and investment in – 
relationships between Council and local communities.     
 
Adaptive capacity 
The Council has showed a willingness to develop new structures, positions, 
programmes to cope with change across and between different departments. Some 
of these are very formal – such as the creation of the Earthquake Recovery 
Committee comprising all Councillors and the Chair of the Kaiapoi Community 
Board, Robyn Wallace - whilst others reflect adaptive capacity more subtly. In 
addition to the formal declaration of a State of Local Emergency, an informal 
example of this was the rapid mobilisation of non-EOC Council staff volunteers on 
Saturday, the 4th of September to Kaiapoi’s ‘ground zero’. Despite it being a 
weekend many staff members, including managers from the policy and planning 
teams, were deployed to ‘keep a strong presence in the streets with Council marked 
vehicles; staff in council marked vests/clothing; elected members occasionally 
touching base with the general public’. That day, council staff also participated in the 
door-knocking exercises that distributed and gathered information. Though useful in 
and of itself, this deployment indicated a far more significant shift and a very clear 
message to staff and residents alike: This not Business as Usual.   
 
Given the protracted and constantly changing face of earthquake-related issues – 
from the initial event that caused liquefaction and lateral spread in Kaiapoi, Pines 
Beach and Kairaki, to the consequences of engineering recommendations around 
the structural safety of buildings that has led to the closure of many shops in 
Rangiora – another challenge has been to develop a framework flexible enough to 
accommodate both recovery and Business as Usual. During the two years since the 
earthquake, the Waimakariri District Council has undergone a number of changes 
involving new appointments, the creation and dissolution of entire 
units/departments and special committees, as well as the introduction of dedicated 
budget streams, steering groups, and infrastructure delivery programmes. A suite of 
new processes has also been introduced, ranging from the Hub-based ‘case 
management’ approach to the use of ‘unit rates’ to speed up the rebuild tender 
process, and the transition to soft copy for building consents. Other examples are 
noted below, but the underlying point is that the Council has been willing to 
experiment with, and modify, processes and structures if it facilitates a good 
outcome for the community. The underlying message appears to be ‘outcome 
before process’; this is not usually a characteristic of bureaucracies.    
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This willingness and ability to change – adaptive capacity – has been facilitated by 
the size, culture and capability of the organisation. Waimakariri District Council (at 
about 235 FTE staff members) is not so small that it is stretched to capacity and 
struggling to fulfil its legislative obligations. Instead, the organisation is large enough 
that the benefits derived from economies of scale still outweigh the costs of 
administration that generally plague bureaucracies (such as the introduction of 
another layer of management, increasing reliance on processes rather than 
outcomes, convoluted and delayed decision-making, etc). The staff has sufficient 
depth and breadth to manage many important functions in house, but it is not so 
large that it is entirely self-contained. This means that it is still important for council 
to build good, working relationships with external partners (social services, 
consultants and contractors). Contractors and consultants are also able to negotiate 
with council at the appropriate level of management. The organisation therefore 
had a well-established ‘architecture of engagement’ with its peacetime partners, 
and was able add capacity and capability according to need in a rapidly changing 
environment without losing its core identity or culture.   
 
Pro-active and cost-effective 
As Olwig (2012, p. 112) has noted, ‘adaptation is not only viewed as an 
environmentally induced response in order to “moderate harm”; it is also perceived 
as the active exploitation of new opportunities’. This active exploitation of 
opportunities is particularly important post-disaster when almost everything has to 
be re-evaluated; some have argued that this unlocking of potential helps combat the 
trauma of the event (Solnit, 2009). This casting around for the silver lining has been 
a notable feature of the Waimakariri District Council’s recovery strategy from the 
very beginning, as this quotation from Rob Kerr, the Infrastructure Recovery 
Manager shows: 
I remember Gerard and I were sitting on top of a culvert trying to 
work out what the hell had gone on with the culvert because the 
land had changed and water was different. And we were sitting 
on this culvert and it looked like it would be really stuffed. When 
we saw it you knew we’d end up replacing it. Anyway, I said look 
this is an opportunity to rebuild this town in a great way…We’ve 
got a significant percentage completely trashed and we’re going 
to have to fix it up. It lacked some amenity before then, so this is 
an opportunity not only to make the infrastructure more resilient 
but, more importantly, to make the new streetscape and the 
landscape more attractive.  
  
This pro-active, rather than reactive, approach was adopted on other occasions too 
but it is apparent that what counts as ‘evidence’ or ‘justified action’ is problematic 
when the goal is ‘prevention rather than cure’. The further irony here is that if one 
successfully prevents an undesirable situation arising, the savings can never be 
calculated. An example of this was feeding the contractors during the response 
phase. The cost is easily counted, but the benefits in terms of facilitating midday 
briefings and information flow cannot actually be quantified. The coordination that 
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flowed from these briefings, and savings in contractors’ time and energy that 
resulted, will never be known.  
 
Another example concerns the provision of the temporary shopping mall in 
Rangiora’s High Street. It involved a large, easily quantifiable net cost to Council (in 
the order of $300K). Yet the loss of a viable town centre, loss of confidence in the 
recovery process and the agencies that manage it, and the generation of hidden 
social, environmental and economic costs associated with servicing a dispersed 
urban form are much harder to calculate.24  Nonetheless, there is a long list of 
examples, detailed below, suggesting the Waimakariri District Council’s recovery 
framework does factor in some of these more difficult – more qualified – 
considerations, and reflects a reluctance to displace the costs of some decisions to 
future generations or other service providers. Being cost-effective depends on what 
costs are counted, when, and by whom. 
 
Evidence and mandate 
Both the response and recovery phases have demanded Council make decisions 
quickly, in often uncertain and rapidly changing environments. The modern ‘rational’ 
planning model involves defining a problem, establishing objective assessment 
criteria, developing all possible solutions, choosing the best of them, 
implementation then monitoring progress. It assumes there is enough time, 
information and resource available but, as Lindblom (1959, 197925) has most 
famously argued, this is never actually the case, even at the best of times. During the 
worst of times, such as disaster recovery, the limitations of time and information 
flow are even more pronounced, with more decisions needing to be made more 
rapidly;  thus different forms of ‘evidence’ were needed.  These include, for 
example, surveys, ‘checking in’ with people, ‘triangulation’ of data, co-location, 
appointing a dedicated earthquake ‘coms’ person, and emphasising the quality and 
reliability of the information source as well as the quantity of data.  
 
In this vein, one item that was seen as something of an opportunity lost was the 
placarding system that was used to designate residential buildings status as fit for 
purpose. Given trained building inspectors undertook these assessments, more 
information than ‘green’, orange’, ‘red’ could have been given to home owners, and 
more useful evidence could have been gathered to inform decisions around 
displacement, temporary housing needs and approximate number of temporary 
repairs/consents needed. It was suggested that a rapid, but slightly more detailed, 
                                                 
24
 Such calculations have a dedicated branch of ethics - ‘phronesis’ - which is sometimes translated as 
‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. Originally applied to the ability of a ruler to judge finely the ‘right’ 
amount of tax to levy on his subjects, the idea has been resurrected by Bent Flyvbjerg, formerly 
Professor of Planning at Aalborg University, Denmark, currently Professor of Major Programme 
Management at Oxford University, and author of Rationality and Power (1998) and Making Social 
Science Matter (2001).  
25
 But see also the ‘communicative turn’ and, for example, Healy, 1992; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-
Jones, 2002. 
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system be developed based on tick boxes indicating roof/walls/foundation integrity 
and water/sewer/phone/electricity availability.  
 
People before pipes 
Jim Palmer has been reported as stating that “Our success will not be measured by 
the kilometres of pipe and road that we replace, but by how the people come 
through this”. This focus, in part, justifies the title Community-based Recovery 
Framework but it also raises questions about what this means in practice.  While 
more detailed accounts are provided in the body of this report, several examples 
that illustrate this “people first, engineering second” approach during the response 
phase were: 
 
Presence and communication - especially the swift deployment (on 4th Sept 2010) of 
Council staff members to Kaiapoi, with food for contractors and information for 
residents.  
 
Taking responsibility – by, for example, stepping across the boundary. Traditionally 
TLAs do not step across the home-owner’s boundary and any infrastructure issues 
between the house and the front boundary is the owner’s problem. But post-
earthquake it would have been impossible to just call a plumber to get the issue 
fixed, so Waimakariri District Council made a decision fairly early on to liaise with 
EQC and coordinate repairs across the boundary because “there’s no point us fixing 
our side of the sewer and people still not being able to use it because the pipe 
between the house and the boundary is broken.”  
 
Coordinating, supporting and enabling social service providers - at the Welfare 
Centre, the Recovery Assistance Centre and the Hub, through the provision of 
facilities, goods and services (e.g. rooms, vans, photocopying, payroll, funding 
applications, etc) and assisting with the development of a ‘case management’ rather 
than strictly ‘welfare’ approach. 
 
Similar practices have been in evidence during the recovery phase as well with the 
establishment of the Kaiapoi Hub (which facilitates two-way communication and 
keeping an “ear to the ground”); taking responsibility by essentially project 
managing the Kaiapoi rebuild along with the New Foundations programme to help 
integrate recovery issues; facilitating Red Zone retreat by working with property 
developers through District Plan changes; allowing the use of Council land for 
temporary libraries, housing and shopping facilities; working where possible with 
local employers, NGOs and community groups who provide key social services, 
including pastoral care, case management, advocacy etc.  
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Section E: Recovery Best Practice – Questions and Implications 
The Waimakariri District Council’s Integrated Community-based Recovery 
Framework exhibits many of the qualities and characteristics referred to in 
international recovery best practice, particularly around engaging, and engaging 
with, local communities. The relationships between key council staff members and 
local community representatives are very strong and very positive, and there was 
real consensus from those interviewed outside council that Waimakariri had ‘got it 
right’. As a local Residents’ Association representative told me ‘If somebody was 
going to go and write a model for recovery, there’s a one-stop shop right there’. In a 
letter to Waimakariri District Council Mayor David Ayers (dated 14th June), 
Earthquake recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee commended their approach writing 
“You have been a great example of how to engage constructively with your 
community, and your leadership during these challenging times has also been a 
comfort to your residents”. 
This view has been endorsed by a number of international scholarship experts and 
an independent review conducted by the Future Canterbury Network (FCN). 
Following their evaluation of the Waimakariri District Council’s performance, the 
Network’s Chair reported that “the Waimakariri District Council and its staff have set 
a high standard for the other local government and central government bodies 
responsible for the recovery from the earthquakes to follow…It is a shining example 
of what can be done for a community struggling to cope with disaster” (FCN, 2011).  
This raises questions about whether or not the Waimakariri District Council’s 
Integrated Community-based Recovery Framework can be adopted and applied in 
other contexts. Some factors, including particular personalities such as Jim Palmer 
the CEO, Simon Markham the Recovery Manager, Sandra James the Social Recovery 
Manager, Robb Kerr the Infrastructure Recovery Manager, and Mayor David Ayers 
are not exactly replicable. Nor are the distinctive synergies that arise from the many 
others involved – Senior Management and other Council staff members, the 
Councillors, Jude Archer’s team of Earthquake Support Co-ordinators, and some very 
capable and committed community leaders. Nonetheless the principles outlined 
above, including leadership, co-ordination, people before pipes, clear, two-way 
communication, engaging and engaging with locals, etc could be adopted elsewhere. 
If adopted, they would likely lead to other, equally distinctive, context-dependent 
synergies.  
 
Another important question is whether the Waimakariri District Council’s Integrated 
Community-based Recovery Framework can be up-scaled to larger organisations and 
metropolitan areas. Most of the interviewees who reflected on the issue of up-
scaling thought it would be more difficult and different - but by no means impossible 
- particularly if the principles outlined above guided the process. As one interviewee 
argued “the attitude can be applied to any scale, and that’s what’s important”.  
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Some of those interviewed had clearly given the practical matters associated with 
up-scaling a great deal of thought and recommended making sure recovery was 
dealt with at the ‘human scale’, as ‘villages’ of about 1, 000-1,500 households. Each 
village should be further divided into clusters that residents could relate to  and 
identify with (Figure 15). The integrative role of a Hub providing a range of services, 
and the co-location (and willingness to interact and get to know each other’s 
business) of Social Recovery and Infrastructure Recovery Managers was seen as 
crucial. The programmes from each village could then be brought together for 
procurement, temporary housing provision, engineering and design protocols, and 
contractor resource management. Sandra James was keen to point out that this 
overarching organisation would be there to serve the needs of each village, not to 
control their activities.  
 
Figure 15: Human scale streetscapes - Kaiapoi East 
 
Given the very positive contribution the Waimakariri District Council’s Community-
Based Recovery Framework makes to disaster scholarship, important questions must 
be asked about the roles and responsibilities of local government during response 
and recovery phases, and the legislative environment in which they operate. This  
report documents one council’s breadth and depth of recovery work and provides 
good evidence that, although they may choose not to do so, local government is 
uniquely positioned to undertake a ‘holistic’, co-ordinated and integrated approach. 
This does not always mean ‘doing’ the work, as in ‘delivering’ social services for 
example, but rather showing leadership around delegating, coordinating, facilitating, 
enabling and mobilising community strengths and assets.  
 
Having a good understanding of organisational and community assets helps enable 
the balancing of recovery and Business as Usual functions, and underpins Recovery 
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Manager Simon Markham’s ‘Contexts for Recovery Management’ matrix. It provides 
a guide against which TLAs might assess the extent to which recovery issues can be 
accommodated within existing council structures. An important point to note is the 
way relationships with external bodies would vary as one moves around the matrix. 
It highlights the way recovery can be a very long-term process, but one that can be 
facilitated by good relationships with consultants and contractors outside the 
organisation pre-disaster. The size of council – not too big, not too small also helped 
the organisation move around this matrix by adding/subtracting capacity and 
capability reasonably quickly. Described by Jim Palmer as ‘a nimble glacier, if you can 
imagine such a thing’ the organisation’s core was strong enough to maintain 
functionality, but was not so big it could achieve all it had to using in-house 
resources. By nature of its size, it has had to reach out and form those relationships 
that worked so well post-disaster; indeed, this may be one reason why ‘medium’ 
size councils generally tend to perform well across a number of indicators. 26  
 
This raises further questions about the broader legislative context within which local 
government operates. It remains to be seen just how TLAs will respond to the Local 
Government Act amendment which removes two clauses from the legislation that 
were relevant to this case study. These are:   
To enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, 
communities; and  
To promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of 
communities, in the present and for the future. 
 
These will be replaced with:  
To meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality local 
infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions 
in a way that is most cost-effective for households and businesses. 
 
Though this approach might meet the ‘peacetime’ wishes of residents who have 
little appetite for rate increases, its utility in terms of disaster preparedness, 
response and recovery is much less certain.  
 
This leads to a final question around the actions local authorities can take now to 
prepare, not just for response in the CDEM sense, but for recovery which is 
prolonged, expensive and traumatic. Some indications are provided here: cultivate 
good, functional relationships beyond the organisation; attend civil defence training 
exercises; pre-appoint a Recovery and Social Recovery Manager with a background 
in community development if possible;  treat your consultants and contractors well; 
keep an up-to-date, well-mapped list of assets; undertake regular hazard 
assessments; and keep debt under control; and foster some consensus between the 
bureaucracy and elected members around the core purpose of the organisation 
without eliminating healthy debate over how to achieve that.  
                                                 
26
 See the BERL (2011) Regional Rankings, for example, http://www.berl.co.nz/economic-
insights/economic-development/regions/buller-tops-berl-regional-rankings-in-2011/.  Measured 
across employment growth, population growth and business units growth, Buller attained first place, 
and Waimakariri District Council was third. Of the top 10, 8 could be described as ‘medium’ size.  
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Appendix 1: An example of a Waimakariri District Council 
‘response’ update to residents  
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Appendix 2: Pre-Event Recovery Planning and Management 
Checklist (Simon Markham, Recovery Manager, Waimakariri 
District Council) 
 
Set out below is a schema based on the Waimakariri District Council’s experience for 
considering the differing disaster contexts within both pre-event preparedness 
planning and post-event recovery management can be considered and developed. 
Key determinates are the potential / actual geographic spread – relative to 
administrative boundaries – and the relative severity and especially the duration – 
both of the disaster event/sequence and of the required recovery process.  
 
Applying this schema to pre-event planning and post event management needs also 
to consider the general sequence of phases in disaster management as set out 
below and observed in the Hurricane Katrina situation. 
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The Waimakariri experience has shown that while this general phasing holds good, 
the degree of phase ‘overlap’ is often much greater, especially in disaster sequences 
with different areas differentially affected through time; and that improvement 
strategies – unless thought about early and founded in/connected to pre-event 
ongoing risk reduction/resiliency/general enhancement planning – can be lost 
opportunities under the pressure to rebuild and normalize the situation as soon as 
possible.  
Also this phasing is generally conceptualized and planned for in terms of physical 
damage and its recovery. Experience has shown that social, economic and 
environmental recovery phasing does not necessarily accord with nor accompany 
this general depiction.  
Generally speaking, short duration, localised impact events within the scope of a 
single Controller/Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) are response dominated and 
require little dedicated recovery management per se or only activation of a limited 
recovery management programme. The relevant territorial local authority (TLA) can 
generally undertake this within their own resources, possibly with CDEM Group level 
specialist resourcing to supplement local control and operations. Response to 
recovery transition is relatively seamless.      
Somewhat larger scale events/sequences over larger geographic areas bring into 
contention in the response phase coordination across EOCs and activation of 
Regional Group management structures. Recovery management remains highly 
context specific depending on the nature and spread of the damage. The issue of 
whether recovery management is to remain separate, as extensions of individual 
jurisdiction’s EOCs, or to be integrated cross TLAs and/or merged with the Group 
needs to be addressed, preferably in pre-event preparedness planning rather than in 
the thick of the response phase as it is happening.   
More severe/longer duration but still localised events means TLA EOC and Regional 
Group response and recovery structure coordination and potentially full scale 
integration issues arise and need to be addressed. If very severe then national 
intervention/resourcing and certainly monitoring will be in contention.      
Large scale, severe events of long duration with major damage to be recovered 
from, such as the 2010-12 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, have led to significant 
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adhoc interventions in legislation, to facilitate recovery and agencies to implement 
multifaceted recovery programmes, never before required or indeed conceptualized 
in the New Zealand setting. Pre-existing regional level recovery management 
arrangements were rapidly overwhelmed and superseded through this Sequence as 
an unprecedented national emergency. Despite this, all preexisting TLA disaster and 
ordinary management responsibilities have still been in play albeit subject to 
national directive in key aspects.       
At the small - medium scale TLA level such as Waimakariri District with severe 
localised damage to contend with, alongside the massive scale of damage in 
Christchurch City, a challenge has been determining the nature and extent of local 
recovery management, underpinned by local leadership, but underpinning local 
responsiveness – versus the organisational requirements for accessing the necessary 
national and private sector resources to implement recovery.  The District Council 
made a conscious decision to accept as much local responsibility and influence over 
recovery as it could and resourced and scaled up accordingly, albeit in an adhoc 
manner.  An unanticipated consequence of this approach was the amount of inter-
agency engagement and multi-party relationship management that would be 
required as a result. But it is suggested that all TLAs need to reflect on as a matter of 
broad approach how they will react to the situation should it arise ‘on their watch’. 
Having a conversation with their community to understand their expectations would 
be a good start.    
It is still a matter of debate as to whether the legislative and organisational 
interventions that have arisen as result of the Canterbury Sequence as a high 
impact/low probability disaster should remain adhoc, to be established on a case by 
case basis when the need arises in the future, or whether these should be in some 
way ‘normalized’ within the ongoing CDEM legislative and organisational framework. 
Until this is resolved, pre-event planning elsewhere by both TLA and Group CDEM 
agencies for this scale of disaster is problematic and rather speculative.     
Again generally speaking, recovery management plans and structures need to be 
highly adaptive – that is, flexible according to the nature of the event and the 
damage to be recovered from and rapidly scalable in accordance with the demands 
of the situation. Founding a ‘Recovery Plan’ in a single structural response in accord 
with a single event scale/severity/duration scenario will not be sufficient 
preparedness.  Pre-event depiction of plausible disaster/damage scenarios and 
thoroughly testing recovery management arrangements against them is necessary.  
While there is ongoing, albeit infrequent, testing among TLAS/Groups of response 
phase cross boundary co-ordination and collaboration, (e.g. in EOC response 
training), there is little in the way of this for recovery management at present.  The 
following checklist signals some of the recovery management situations needing to 
be thought about and planned for.     
 
Issue/Topic 
 
 
Localised/Low Impact Event 
 
Widespread/Severe Event 
Social Recovery 
 
Transition out of small scale  
response phase welfare assistance 
to temporary housing, 
work/income and psycho-social      
Possibly large scale/long term 
provision of temporary housing, 
planning for and securing 
delivery of permanent 
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assistance and support as well as 
insurance advisory assistance for 
small numbers of displaced 
persons/households for 
days/weeks and in the case of 
insurance, months.  
substitute housing; significant 
programmes of initially food, 
then income support and 
psycho-social      assistance as 
well as insurance advisory 
assistance for large numbers of 
displaced persons and 
households for months and 
years.    
 
Structures and programmes to 
distribute philanthropic funds 
for months and years.  
  
Significant outreach 
programmes and community 
development support for 
disaster affected and 
consequentially affected new 
communities lasting years. 
Communications 
and Community 
Engagement  
Targeted affected and wider, 
largely unaffected community   
communications regarding the 
extent and nature of damage, 
places and sources of assistance, 
restoration and rebuilding  plans, 
projects and programmes 
development, timeframes and 
progress.  
 
Targeted engagement at formative 
stages with identified group of 
affected households and 
businesses as input to recovery 
decision making.  
Major upscale from 
localised/low impact event 
context with possibly very large 
scale targeted and mass 
communications involving 
multiple channels spanning 
months and years.  
 
Major investment required in 
communications resourcing and 
information assistance.  
 
Possibly many processes and 
rounds of community 
engagement with communities 
at large and structures and 
processes for ongoing 
engagement with pre-existing 
and newly formed groups and 
organisations as result of the 
disaster.  
 
Ongoing significant Media 
interest, scrutiny and required 
management. 
Community  
Facilities and 
‘Social 
Infrastructure’ 
Recovery 
Unavailable/damaged/destroyed 
community facility(ies) and 
localised sports and community 
group owned building(s) requiring 
temporary repair and rebuilding or 
replacement. May be some 
Major losses to community 
facilities and social 
infrastructure. From dozens to 
possibly hundreds of 
community facilities, parks, 
reserves and sports grounds, 
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opportunity for improvement. 
Funding sources and strategies 
generally localised but may involve 
regional/central funding agency 
support.    
etc. damaged/destroyed.  
 
Major facility/reserve/grounds 
assessment and repair and 
replacement strategies required 
as well as significant interim use 
and accommodation planning.  
 
Testing and reconsideration of 
pre-event facility and reserves 
asset management plans, 
budgets and priorities.  
 
Significant opportunities for 
facility enhancements (‘not 
going to just build back the way 
it was’) and review of service 
levels through replacement 
approaches required. 
 
All of the above entails 
significant consultation and 
engagement with affected 
groups, funders and the 
community.          
Economic 
Recovery  
Most likely damage is to farm and 
forestry properties and businesses 
and may be damage/destruction to 
isolated/town commercial buildings 
and businesses.  Targeted support 
and connection to Government 
assistance programmes for small 
numbers of readily identified 
businesses. Weeks and months of 
business interruption and possibly 
long term farm and town business 
impacts.    
Possibly large to very large 
business interruption spanning 
years. Major destruction of farm 
properties and/or town and/or 
city business buildings and 
equipment and information 
assets.  
 
Immediate large scale 
farm/forest/business support 
programmes lasting 
months/years required. 
Significant temporary business 
accommodation may be 
required to avoid business 
failure.    
 
Major temporary and 
permanent 
relocation/alternative premises 
required to restore employment 
and business function causing 
significant challenges for 
accommodation availability and 
land use planning in terms of 
town centre and business area 
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land use planning. 
 
Cause for major accelerated 
review/development of town 
/suburban centre or central city 
centre plans and strategies 
designed to re-
establish/regenerate     business 
activity.   
 
Land Retreat,  
Residential Rebuild  
and  New 
Residential 
Development  
No/small number of properties 
withdrawn from active use due to 
land damage/land stability risks 
arising from the event and the 
natural hazard it reflects. May 
involved Government/ TLA buyout 
programme.   
Possibly large scale retreat 
investigations and decision-
making processes entailing 
significant Central Government 
intervention.  
 
Major retreat planning and 
process management, requiring 
significant affected community 
engagement and support 
programmes. 
 
Significant EQC/private sector 
led housing repair and rebuild 
programme generating demand 
for information, advisory and 
advocacy support programmes   
 
Consequential upon retreat 
requirements for accelerated 
residential land development 
and housing to provide 
alternative long term living 
accommodation.    Can have 
significant land use planning 
prerequisites and urban form 
implications.  
Infrastructure 
Repair and Rebuild 
Limited amount of network 
infrastructure damaged and 
requiring temporary and then 
permanent rebuild.  
 
Some opportunities for enhanced 
resiliency.   
Large scale damage to network 
infrastructure leading to a 
significant programme of 
restoration and maintenance of 
interim services. 
 
Major repair and replacement 
programmes across all forms of 
horizontal infrastructure 
requiring damage assessment, 
rebuild strategy development 
and funding planning, 
programme/project 
management and delivery 
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procurement and operations.  
 
Significant opportunities for 
enhanced service levels and 
resiliency.     
Environmental 
Recovery 
 
Damage to localised natural areas 
and ecology affecting all forms of 
wildlife and habitats. Natural 
recovery processes take time as 
does the extent and nature of 
interventions to assist recovery to 
be determined.   
More widespread and longer 
lasting damage, possibly 
irreversible. Significant across-
jurisdictional recovery 
programmes and coordination 
required, needing to be 
integrated with ongoing 
environmental management 
programmes.      
 
 
